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While the net returns provided by Private Equity (PE) funds to its investors is a debated 
topic in relation to diminishing alpha and justification of fees and other fund expenses, we 
seek to determine if PE ownership has a positive impact on the operating performance of 
Norwegian portfolio companies. Additionally, we seek to identify potential operating 
performance differences between industry specialized and generalist PE managers and 
between deal types (source of entry). By applying an extensive and unique dataset 
consisting of 214 Norwegian buyouts occurring between 2000-2015, we find that PE in 
Norway generates a significantly higher growth in sales and EBITDA compared to 
companies not backed by PE. We also identify improvements in working capital efficiency. 
However, we find no evidence of improvements in operating profitability (ROA). 
Examining the subcomponents of ROA provides some evidence of improvements in asset 
turnover which are offset by a negative development in margins. Our findings do not 
support a positive industry specialization effect. Examining deal types, we find evidence of 
improvements in margins and operating profitability for public buyouts, also relative to 
private-to-private buyouts. In contrast, private-to-private buyouts appear to be more growth-
oriented, clearly outperforming their benchmark in sales growth. The overall findings imply 
that revenue and EBITDA growth appears to be the main focus and driver behind value 
creation in Norwegian portfolio companies, rather than cutting costs and focusing on 
margins. Our findings also suggest that PE ownership provides advantageous differentiated 
support for growth and expansion buyout candidates (typically private companies) and for 
margin improvement buyout candidates (typically public companies). 
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1. Introduction  
Does Private Equity ownership have a positive impact on operating performance? After the 
Private Equity (PE) industry and LBOs emerged in the late 1970s in the US, the private 
equity model quickly developed in the UK and further into mainland Europe, including 
Norway, during the mid- and late-1980s (Wright et al., 1992). Since then, Private Equity in 
Norway has experienced substantial growth in the number of PE funds, General Partners 
(GPs) and assets under management (AUM). In 2001, The Norwegian Venture Capital & 
Private Equity Association (NVCA) and Argentum Fondsinvesteringer was founded2. 
Besides generating a high ROIC, Argentum aims to help stimulate the creation of private 
equity investment groups in Norway and has been an important contributor to the growth 
and internationalization of the Norwegian PE market (Hammerich, 2020). In 2018, around 
62.500 people worked in 160 Norwegian PE-backed companies, up from 25.000 in 2001, 
constituting approximately 3.5% of the private sector (NVCA, 2019). In 2019, investments 
in Norwegian companies by both Norwegian3 (NOK ~5.0 bn) and foreign PE funds (NOK 
~27.0 bn) were NOK 31.3 bn, up from 7.1 bn in 2007 (NVCA, 2019).  
While the PE industry in Norway and the Nordics has experienced significant growth since 
the early 1990s, the competition and committed capital have grown rapidly as well, resulting 
in increasing buyout multiples. In 2009 the median entry EV/EBITDA multiple for Nordic 
buyout deals equaled 6.1x and has since increased by 79% to 11.0x in 20194 (Argentum, 
2020). As it is becoming more challenging to acquire underpriced assets and obtain a 
multiple expansion supported by leverage, the importance of utilizing operational value 
levers to generate competitive returns to investors is increasing in the Nordics. A trend that 
is broadly apparent in the western PE markets as well (Bain & Co, 2019). Thus, as the 
Private Equity outperformance on fund-level (in terms of gross and net returns to its Limited 
Partners (LPs)) is a highly debated topic, much due to the risk impact of higher multiples 
and leverage, the high fee levels, the weaknesses of multiple measurement metrics (such as 
 
2 NVCA provides comprehensive information about the private equity industry in Norway and Argentum is a Norwegian 
government owned asset manager that has been dedicated to private equity since it was established.  
3 NVCA defines Norwegian private equity firm as a firm with headquarters located in Norway. If the HQ is located outside 
of Norway it is categorized as a foreign PE firm. 
4 2019 was the sixth consecutive year that the multiples were rising since 2013 (Argentum, 2020). 
    
the IRR), and asymmetric incentives relative to LPs (see e.g. Phalippou, 2020), this thesis 
focuses on the underlying operating performance on portfolio company-level. As the 
operating performance of the portfolio companies has increasingly become a critical factor 
for PE firms to generate positive alpha returns, we find it interesting and relevant to study 
the operating performance amongst Norwegian PE-backed companies compared to non-PE 
backed companies. For the majority of Norwegian portfolio companies, PE capital has been 
reported to have a positive effect on performance and growth. From 2001-2018, the value 
creation in portfolio companies, as measured by Menon Economics (2020)5, has achieved a 
CAGR of 13%6. In 2019, NVCA reported that the total value creation in portfolio 
companies amounted to NOK 47 bn in 2018, comprising right below 2% of Norway’s 
mainland GDP. However, in order to determine if PE is a superior ownership form in value 
creation, we need to measure these returns to the returns generated in comparable 
companies. 
Similar to Kaplan (1989), we define operating performance as referring predominately to all 
measures that increase the cash flow of the portfolio company, namely sales growth, 
operating income, EBITDA, margin expansion and streamlining of capital. Thus, we will 
isolate our analysis to each portfolio company’s financial accounts to evaluate their 
performance, disregarding performance on the fund-level. Particularly, we focus on 
EBITDA/Total Assets (as a proxy for the Return on Assets (ROA)) to measure the change in 
operating profitability. A further breakdown of ROA will be conducted including metrics 
depicting the operational efficiency and growth. Furthermore, we analyze the reported 
accounts between the year prior to PE-entry and the five subsequent years post-buyout, and 
also include the year prior to exit to assess the changes during the holding period. The 
development in performance will be benchmarked against a carefully constructed group of 
companies operating in the same industry at the same time, as well as sharing similarities in 
terms of size, sales, margins and asset turnover. This is conducted by applying a statistical 
method called propensity score matching. Additionally, we attempt to address some caveats 
in the previous research on PE operating performance of reverse causality issues where PE 
 
5 Measured by Menon Economics as EBITDA plus personnel expenses as a proxy for contribution to GDP. 
6 To make a coarse comparison, the OSE benchmark index shows a CAGR of approximately 8.8% over the same period.  
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portfolio companies are not randomly chosen, as well as the length of the holding period 
involved (see e.g. Phalippou (2019) who raises some of these issues). 
As there has been conducted limited research on private equity in Norway, our objective 
with this thesis is to determine whether PE is a superior ownership model in creating 
operational value. We will do so by applying an extensive dataset comprising 214 portfolio 
companies acquired between 2000-2015. We will further segment the results to test and 
understand the relative importance of sector specialization of the GPs and certain deal types. 
Thus, with our novel and unique dataset, our objective is to explore the relationship between 
these variables and performance in the Norwegian PE industry. 
The paper is organized as follows, we will start by describing the Private Equity market and 
business model, and important changes since the start of the PE industry in the late 1970s. 
More specifically, we will explain how a PE fund is usually structured and operates, certain 
PE deal types, as well as present the main value levers and success factors in PE, and how 
these levers have developed in importance. Additionally, we will describe the difference 
between specialized and generalized fund managers seen in relation to the operating 
performance. In section 3, we will review the academic literature on value creation in PE by 
applying a value creation framework similar to Kaplan (1989). Moreover, we will present 
the empirical research on important structural changes in the PE market related to specific 
deal types and specialization effects, all in relation to the operating performance. Based on 
the previous literature we formulate three hypotheses which we present in the beginning of 
section 4. Further, we present the applied data as well as the empirical method we use in 
section 4, before we provide the results with a corresponding discussion in section 5, and 
how the results should be interpreted. Finally, in section 6 we conclude and provide 
suggestions for further research.  
    
2. The Private Equity Market and Business Model 
In this section we will describe the private equity market and provide a brief overview of 
how the market has changed over time. Further, we assess certain key elements of the PE 
business model and key levers for value creation. Additionally, we outline the categorization 
of PE deal types as a part of the business model in terms of company selection upon entry 
and exit strategy. Lastly, we will provide a discussion of specialized vs. generalized fund 
managers and how this impacts the level of value creation. 
2.1 The Private Equity Market 
The private equity market consists of different segments or sub-asset classes that differ 
depending on the types of companies the GPs invest in. These companies are classified 
based on the company development stage. More specifically the private equity industry 
invests in venture capital, (i.e., early stage firms), growth capital, which involves sizable and 
growing businesses in need of capital, direction and professional ownership and 
management in order to expand, buyouts, which is referring to mature companies typically 
with potential to improve their business model and/or competitiveness (commonly referred 
to as Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)), and distressed companies, which refers to mature, but 
unprofitable companies. In our thesis we focus on buyouts and growth capital PE 
investments, while venture capital is excluded from the analysis as there are very different 
drivers defining investments in and development of such companies. Hence, we will use the 
terms buyouts and PE interchangeably when referring to either buyouts (or LBOs) or growth 
capital investments. 
2.1.1 The Global Market Development  
Since Private Equity emerged in the late 1970’s by the establishment of US and UK PE 
firms like KKR, Thomas H. Lee Partners, Candover, Forstmann Little, Clayton, Dubilier & 
Rice and Cinven, the PE market has experienced significant growth in size and scope. 
Current global AUM in the buyout and growth capital segment has reached $2.8 trillion or 
nearly 2.7x more than in 2010 (Preqin, 2019). It represents the largest alternative asset 
segment with 32% dedicated to buyout capital and 11% to growth capital or a total of 43% 
of total alternative assets, followed by 28% in real assets, 17% in Venture capital/other, and 
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13% in private debt (Preqin, 2019). Historically, PE has generated high returns, both in 
absolute terms and relative to public markets which manifests itself in the growth and 
capital inflows to the asset class. Yet, as the private equity has matured, the degree of 
outperformance relative to public indices has declined (Harris et al., 2016). It has also 
become increasingly correlated with public equities (Welsch, 2017). As such, we can 
observe a declining relative performance in the PE industry as the spread in returns between 
private and public equities have started to converge, closing a three-decade gap in 
performance. Moreover, the initial PE boom dominated by so-called public-to-private 
transactions have fallen out of favor compared to previous levels, replaced by private-to-
private buyouts (Næss-Schmidt et al., 2017). At the same time, the relative importance of 
value levers has changed over the past 40 years. While optimizing the financial structure in 
portfolio companies and multiple expansion was previously a significant part of PE firms’ 
value creation, this has gradually become less relevant (Harris et al., 2014; Næss-Schmidt et 
al., 2017). Meanwhile, operating performance and more specifically top line growth levers 
have increased in importance. This is related to the increasing share of PE investments going 
into growth industries and a longer PE holding period on average than the earlier buyouts 
(Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018).  
The PE industry has transformed substantially since its introduction in the late 1970s. 
Similar to other industries generating super profit, more competition will follow, leading to 
increasing amounts of capital and talent competing for a limited number of high-quality 
assets. Effectively, the GPs value creation mandate has become more challenging as they 
depend on finding and exploiting new levers to create value. In particular, finding profitable 
investments at an attractive price has become a difficult task. A survey by Preqin (2018) 
shows that the No. 1 source of concern among 70% of GP respondents across the world, is 
the concern for overheated asset valuation. Over the past two decades, the increased 
multiples have accentuated the importance of having a more growth and operationally 
oriented investment thesis for each deal, i.e. a more systematic and operationally focused 
approach to value creation (Ketels et al., 2019). BCG reports that, on average, around 70% 
to 80% of value creation from prominent PE firms now stems from EBITDA growth, 
whereas only 10% to 15% comes from multiples and financial engineering (Ketels et al., 
2019). According to Heel & Kehoe (2005), the increasing and intense competition has 
forced private equity firms to start focusing on creating value in their portfolio firms’ 
operations in order to stay competitive. 
    
In sum, Private equity firms have evolved from focusing on improving the capital structure, 
increasing the leverage and identifying underpriced deals to encompass enhancements in the 
operational efficiency (von Laskowski, 2012). The eras of private equity can as such be 
classified into financial restructuring (exemplified by KKR’s famous barbarians at the gate 
attack on N.J.R Nabisco) to financial engineering powered by high leverage ratios and 
multiple expansions, to the more operational efficiency focused era (pioneered by PE firms 
such as Clayton, Dubilier & Rice) to the more growth-oriented type strategies (pioneered by 
PE firms like General Atlantic). Throughout these eras, enhanced corporate governance has 
become a key factor as the interplay between the owners, the board and management are 
critical to effectively execute an operational and growth focused investment thesis.  
2.2 The Private Equity Business Model 
Most PE funds are organized as limited partnerships where the PE fund manager acts as a 
general partner and manages the fund with full discretion, while the limited partners are the 
investors providing most of the equity capital7 (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). Typically, 
each individual fund has a lifespan of 10 years with an option to extend for an additional 
two to three year upon LPs approval.  
Over the first six years (the investment period) after having closed the fund, PE firms invest 
directly in portfolio companies through the fund (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018) based on 
an overall investment thesis, and typically exits the same investments after a two till six year 
active ownership holding period. As such, the PE model value chain consists of four main 
steps: (1) fundraising from investors, also referred to as Limited Partners (LPs), (2) 
screening opportunities and investing by acquiring a large stake of the portfolio companies, 
(3) managing the portfolio company through active ownership, and lastly, (4) realizing 
capital gains by exiting (selling) the investment (Gilligan & Wright 2008). Hence, PE 
investments include elements that would make it difficult to replicate in a public setting 
(Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). 
 
 
7 Notably, in order to achieve the limited partnership status, the GPs have to provide at least 1 percent of the total capital 
commitment to the fund, and often invest even more (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). 
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Figure I - PE Firm Structure 
 
In Figure I we can see a typical overview of how PE firms are usually structured. Before any 
acquisitions are made by a new fund, a holding company is usually created and funded with 
equity from the fund, as well as outside debt from banks or debt funds. Thus, on the 
company level, which we focus on in this thesis, we have the different portfolio companies 
that have been acquired by the PE fund. The holding company subsequently acquires and 
holds the portfolio company. 
The PE firms target three overall value levers during this process: multiple arbitrage, 
leverage and operating performance improvements, where the latter lever has become 
increasingly important over the last two decades (see Figure II). 
Reflecting these levers, empirical studies highlight company selection, favorable price to 
intrinsic value, deal structuring (leverage, shareholder agreements, etc.), a well prepared 
and executed exit strategy and improving the portfolio company’s operating performance as 
the critical success factors of the PE business model. These are introduced below. We note 
that the focus of this thesis is on operational improvements, however, we provide a brief 
introduction to the other value levers as well (which often are referred to as value capturing) 
for contexture of the anatomy of a typical PE deal and overall value framework.    
 
 
    
Figure II – Value Levers: Sources of Value Contribution (%) 
(Source: Goldman Sachs, BCG-IESE estimate) 
 
2.2.1 Company Selection 
Davis et al. (2019) divides buyouts into four sourcing categories: public-to-private, where a 
quoted company is taken private, divisional, which refers to the situation when a division of 
a company is acquired, private-to-private, where an unquoted company is acquired by a 
private equity firm, and secondary buyout (SBO), where an existing PE portfolio company is 
bought by another private equity firm. For the PE investment to become a success, the target 
must be a suitable candidate for PE ownership. PE firms usually identify the portfolio 
company «candidate» based on specific firm characteristics, driven by the PE manager’s 
strategy and focus. Typical LBO-driven PE firms seek targets with additional borrowing 
capacity and undervalued assets. Research finds that PE firms select targets that have 
growing assets, higher return on assets, higher liquidity, but lower market-to-book and 
leverage ratios (Aslan & Kumar, 2011). Additionally, cash in excess of working capital 
needs and a strong performance record further increases the capacity for debt. In sum, these 
factors create leverage opportunities and potential tax benefits from goodwill write-offs and 
interest payments (DePamphilis, 2014). Furthermore, PE firms prefer targets with a strong 
and highly motivated management team.   
Finally, the business fundamentals of the niche and the target, such as high barriers to entry, 
stability, limited competition and solid growth and scalability potential of proven and 
innovative business concepts are important factors assessed in the selection process. 
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Additionally, the company’s financial robustness is a critical factor for success (Oppler & 
Titman, 1993; Acharya et al., 2009). Moreover, for growth strategies, which have increased 
in importance over the past two decades, the fragmentation and the presence of scale and 
skill in an industry niche are defining characteristics. 
2.2.2 Price to Intrinsic Value 
A second critical success factor to buyouts is paying a price which is favorable to intrinsic 
value. Empirical research suggests that, whether it’s a buyout or another form of acquisition, 
the acquirer needs to be careful with paying too high of a price for the deal. Overpaying 
implies that less value is created from the deal (Koller et al., 2010). Additionally, high 
transaction prices are associated with higher deal leverage and lower buyout fund returns 
and suggest that acquirers tend to overpay when access to credit is easier (Axelson et al., 
2013). This can violate loan covenant restrictions and lead to time consuming and costly 
renegotiations with the lenders on loan agreement terms (DePamphilis, 2014), and in worst 
case defaults. 
2.2.3 Deal Structuring  
Typically, PE funds raise equity at the time they are formed, and raise additional capital 
when investments are made. This additional capital is usually raised in the form of debt 
from third parties such as banks (Axelson et al., 2009). The use of debt normally has a lower 
cost of capital than equity which combined with tax shields reduces the overall capital cost 
of financing the buyout. The reduction in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) by 
incurring a larger amount of debt results in a higher yield to equity. As the debt is paid 
down, usually with the cash flow from the portfolio company, the value of the equity 
increases and healthy returns are generated. 
Moreover, the LP and GP relationship usually involves full discretion (within the fund 
mandate often limiting the GP to specific sectors, size, geographic focus, etc.) for the GP to 
act without consoling with the LP. Normally, any distributions are only made as investments 
are converted into cash and the LP has no right to demand the GP to sell their investment(s) 
(Demaria, C., 2015).    
    
2.2.4 The Exit Strategy 
Phalippou (2019) lists four possible exit routes (besides bankruptcy). The most prevalent is 
trade/strategic sale, which is a sale to another company (corporate acquirer) in a similar or 
related industry, mainly motivated by synergies and scale, competition and regulation. 
Another exit route is a secondary, i.e., a sale of the portfolio company to another PE firm8. 
A third exit route is a dividend recapitalization, described as a partial exit by having the 
company borrowing money to pay a large dividend to its shareholders, and the fourth route 
is an initial public offering, or IPO. The latter is also a partial sale because the PE firm 
retains a meaningful share ownership and control after the IPO before a full sell out is 
executed (Phalippou, 2019). As of 2009, strategic exits or so-called trade sales, represent 
38% of all exits, followed by secondaries occurring in 24% of all exits. The latter has 
increased considerably over time, while IPOs have decreased (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
Moreover, when the economic outlook is uncertain, PE firms prefer strategic exits to IPOs 
as they can sell their entire stake, whereas IPOs imply lockups that restrict how much and 
how quickly they can sell (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). Additionally, strategic sales 
imply lower costs than IPOs, which is a costly and time-consuming exit route implying 
roadshows and considerable underwriting fees (Phalippou, 2019).  
Schwienbacher (2005) suggests that there is a positive relationship between the profitability 
of portfolio companies and the likelihood of going public as these companies are 
characterized by a convincing equity story and high growth prospects. Giot and 
Schwienbacher (2007), also identifies IPOs as the exit route with most attractive investment 
returns. By contrast, secondary buyouts and buybacks are regarded as less preferred as these 
are correlated with lower investment returns (Schmidt et al., 2010). 
In addition to finding the right exit route strategy, an exit requires careful preparation and 
execution to yield the best results. Typically, the exit process starts two to three years before 
exit, to position and develop the portfolio company as favorable as possible for the exit 
itself. Combined, acquiring a company at a favorable price with a later successful exit can 
result in what is referred to as multiple arbitrage (if the company is sold at a higher multiple 
on the same income metric as acquired). Hence, by taking advantage of asymmetric 
 
8 Can also be tertiary and even quaternary buyouts. 
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information, superior bargaining skills, market timing abilities and an efficient allocation of 
resources (selling to the right buyer), PE can capture a substantial amount of value. 
However, as the market has become gradually more competitive and higher-priced, PE has 
responded by focusing more on the operating performance, i.e. growing the value of the 
underlying business, as the main value lever (Gompers et al., 2015).     
2.2.5 Improving The Portfolio Company’s Operating Performance  
Improving the portfolio company’s operating performance is the fifth critical success factor 
of successful PE investments and is increasing in importance as the entry and exit markets 
are becoming increasingly competitive and transparent, reducing the potential for expanding 
the difference between the exit and entry multiple. PE funds typically employ external or in-
house full-time experts who implement a dedicated playbook with initiatives that improve 
the performance, broadly by applying three overarching sets of changes to the portfolio 
companies in which they invest. These can be categorized as financial engineering (i.e. 
optimization of the capital structure by improving net working capital levels, moving 
balance sheet items off the balance sheet such as real estate, capital goods through leasing, 
outsourcing of fixed asset operations), governance engineering (i.e., board composition, 
focus, management incentives, management team composition), and operational 
engineering (i.e. improving operational efficiency). These mechanisms typically trigger a 
process leading to significant and rapid changes in the firm’s capital structure, assets, 
organizational structure and the corporate governance regime (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005), 
and their contribution to value creation are assessed in detail in the literature review. Figure 
III provides a simplified summary of the value levers in the PE deal process. The entry and 
exit stages can be described as value-capturing while the ownership is the stage where value 
is created through improving the operating performance of the company.  
Figure III – Value Levers in The PE Deal Process 
Screen market for potential 
investments
Conduct Due Diligence on 
potential targets and select the 
right company
Secure a lucrative entry price 
and debt funding (deal structure)
Entry
Manage the investment




- Operational Engineering 
Holding Period
Find the right exit route and 
buyer
Leverage negotiation experience 
Sell the investment at a 
favorable price to entry price
Exit
 
    
2.3 Specialized vs Generalist PE Funds  
Cressy et al. (2007) argues that there are advantages of being specialized in particular 
industries or industry stages. A specialist refers to a GP who possesses a high degree of 
knowledge, experience and networks in an industry at level with, or even superior to, 
respected industry «insiders». As a result, specialists experience reduced information 
asymmetries and are expected to know the individual companies’ strengths and weaknesses, 
providing a competitive edge in identifying the most attractive investment candidates 
(Cressy et al., 2007). In addition, specialists are expected to provide more effective active 
ownership, thereby adding more value to the portfolio company compared to diversified PE 
firms. These advantages are in line with research done by Lossen (2007). He finds that 
specialized PE firms have at least three advantages compared to non-specialized PE firms. 
Firstly, specialized PE firms have an information advantage in the screening and pre-
investment process, as this process is typically run as a tight and multi-staged selection 
process, particularly in auction-like processes. During this selection process, more generalist 
PE managers typically face substantial information asymmetry compared to the 
management team or the current owner despite extensive use of external strategy, 
operations, accounting and legal advisors. However, if PE firms are specialized in the 
technology and business of the potential portfolio company, they may have a significant 
competitive advantage both relative to other bidders, the sellers and management (Lossen, 
2007). 
The second advantage is related to the leveraging of the portfolio company. Lossen (2007) 
argues that the more knowledge PE firms have about the industry and markets of the 
portfolio company, the more effectively it is able to raise debt financing from financial 
institutions, including exerting performance pressure on management through leverage. In 
addition, specialized PE firms will be able to execute control rights more effectively 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
Thirdly, specialized PE firms will be better equipped to set direction, establish the right 
management team and incentivize and monitor the team. Lossen (2007) further argues that 
deeper industry knowledge is closely linked to a PE firm's value added to a portfolio 
company. In summary, a specialized PE firm should therefore be able to apply more 
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effective financial, governance, and operational engineering compared to generalized PE 
firms resulting in higher returns than comparable generalist transactions.  
Counterarguments to specialization focus on the ability of generalists to leverage outside 
expertise, building on strong management teams and the value of portfolio diversification. 
Berg & Gottschalg (2005) state that PE firms add value to portfolio companies by 
leveraging their extensive network of contacts in various industries and advisory firms who 
can support them during the investment process. This includes identifying and attracting 
business partners, finding new managers or identifying attractive platforms and add-on 
acquisitions for buy-and-build strategies. In addition, syndication indicates that financial 
risk will be spread between two or more investors, thereby increasing the gains of portfolio 
diversification (Manigart et al., 2006). Furthermore, Acharya et al. (2009) suggests that PE 
firms select targets where there is already a strong management team in place. Strong 
management teams typically possess solid technological, market and product expertise, as 
well as networks comprising experts and investors with relevant knowhow. This might 
offset the advantage that specialized PE firms have compared to generalized PE firms. 
    
3. Literature Review 
Since the emergence of buyouts in the late 1970s private equity have grown from 
constituting a minor share of the capital market to becoming an important global force 
(Jensen, 2007). In parallel, the private equity industry has gained increasing attention from 
academics on various issues - including performance (relative to risk adjusted equity 
returns), how private equity creates value, the costs of the PE model, and the impact on 
society including employment, innovation and banking market exposures.  
In this section we will present and elaborate on relevant existing literature. We will look at 
the performance in the industry and how private equity has developed over time on value 
creation levers, deal types and strategies typical to private equity today and specialist versus 
generalist PE funds. Most of the studies and research on PE stems from abroad and is 
conducted in larger markets, but we will include relevant literature on PE in Norway.  
3.1 Value Creation Framework  
In the wake of the LBO-wave during the 1980’s, Harvard Business Review published an 
article entitled Eclipse of the Public Corporation (Jensen, 19899) predicting that the private 
equity model would become the dominant corporate organizational form. The main 
argument is that the model reduces the value loss caused by the inherent conflict between 
the owners and managers over the control and use of corporate resources, or more 
specifically to ensure that the free cash flow finance projects with positive net present value 
(Jensen, 1989). The foundation of the PE model is built on concentrated ownership stakes, 
highly leveraged financial structures, and powerful long-term performance-based incentives 
including symmetric (to owners) management share ownership. Additionally, the private 
equity firm applies active governance to the companies by being actively involved in 
strategic direction setting, monitoring management, and sometimes even managing the 
company themselves (Jensen, 1989). These structures enhance the alignment between the 
risk carriers and managers of risk, resulting in higher operating efficiency, profitability, 
employee productivity, and shareholder value creation, thus appearing superior to the typical 
 
9 Revised in 1997. 
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public corporation (see e.g., Jensen (1989); Kaplan (1990); Smith et al. (1990); Lichtenberg 
& Siegel (1990)). As such, prior research argues that private equity is a higher performing 
ownership structure in mature as well as growth industries.  
Since the scope of this thesis is to research underlying performance, we will look further 
into the academic research on company level performance. We will do so by applying the 
theoretical framework by Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) inspired by Jensen (1989), namely 
dissecting the operational value creation into three separate categories being; financial, 
governance and operational10. As such, value creation can be defined as mechanisms that 
affect the bottom line either directly through for example altering revenues, margins and 
capital requirements, or indirectly via agency costs and parenting effects (von Laskowski, 
2012)11. Hence, the three components for increasing value are neither all-encompassing nor 
mutually exclusive, whereas improved operating performance is often a result of better 
financial structures and corporate governance, monitoring and control (Jenkinson & Sousa, 
2011). For that reason, we include relevant research on all three sources and their role and 
impact on overall value creation. 
3.1.1 Financial Engineering 
Financial engineering has been most comprehensively defined by Finnerty (1988) as design, 
development and implementation of innovative financial instruments and processes, and 
formulation of solutions to the problems in finance. In an LBO-context, it mainly refers to 
the capital structure that PE investors implement in their portfolio companies based on their 
experience, and knowledge about the capital market in order to optimize it, while reducing 
its tax obligations (Anders, 1992; Berg & Gottshcalg, 2005). Additionally, it refers to the 
structure of the equity incentives they provide to the management teams of their portfolio 
companies (Gompers et al., 2015).  
 
10 Similar frameworks have been applied to evaluate how PE ownership creates value by Berg & Gottschalg, 2005; 
Bergström et al., 2007; Hahn & Kehoe, 2012; Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018; Phalippou, 2019 and Biesinger et al., 2020. 
11 The other common term to mention here is value capturing, which can be defined as mechanisms that occur without any 
changes in the underlying asset’s performance, i.e. primarily related to the entry- and exit-phase of the investment, e.g. 
multiple arbitrage (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005). However, this paper does not focus on this aspect and will not elaborate 
further than what is provided in section 2.2.2 and 2.2.4. 
    
The major element of financial engineering in LBOs is the role of debt used in the 
transaction (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). According to Jensen (1989), debt carries two 
separate advantages: the benefit of corporate tax reductions due to the deductibility of 
interest payments and the incentive benefits of debt. Since debt is transferred to the portfolio 
company’s balance sheet it becomes the management’s responsibility to serve the debt 
through interest and principal payments. As such, it creates pressure on managers not to 
waste money on projects with negative NPV or dissipate cash flows that could rather be paid 
out as dividends to the investor (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Gompers et al., 
2015). Guo et al. (2011) finds a positive correlation between cash flow performance and 
pre-buyout leverage and the increase in leverage as a result of the buyout for LBOs in the 
US between 1990 and 2006. Additionally, the extensive expertise of the capital market 
combined with vast networks enables PE firms to negotiate better financing terms than the 
portfolio company could do standalone, as well as better utilization of low credit rates and 
spreads (Magowan, 1989; Cotter & Peck, 2001; Axelson et al., 2014). Further, DeAngelo 
(1986) emphasizes that PE funds’ awareness of the importance of long-term relationships 
and reputation dependency greatly diminishes the buyout firms’ incentives to transfer wealth 
from its lenders, which PE has been accused for (see e.g., Shleifer & Summers, 1988).  
On the other side, high levels of debt can also be negative as the company’s resilience to 
unexpected external developments or internal developments and potential to make strategic 
investments and responses to increased competition, as well as overall financial flexibility, 
is reduced (Singh, 1990; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). While the early studies insinuated that 
debt mitigates free cash flow problems, several recent studies find that the benefits of debt 
are optimally traded off against the increased risk of costly financial distress and are thus 
priced into the transaction (Jenkinson & Stucke, 2011; Axelson et al, 2013; Døskeland & 
Strömberg, 2018). Moreover, Phalippou (2019) argues that the disciplining effect of debt, 
i.e. incentive benefits, is superficial as the management already should be fully incentivized 
to focus on cash generation via their compensation packages PE is known for providing.  
In Norway, Bienz (2017) proposes three features which private equity firms usually find 
interesting in potential targets: 1) firms are underlevered, 2) firms are underperforming 
and/or 3) firms lack capital or managerial expertise. From conversations with Norwegian 
GPs, feature 3) appeared to be the most relevant and attractive (Bienz, 2017). This coincides 
with Friedrich (2015) who shows that the level of leverage in 105 Norwegian buyouts is not 
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substantially different from comparable companies that have not received PE funding. Also, 
Bienz et al., (2016) document that the change in leverage from the year before the buyout to 
the buyout year is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that historically 
Norwegian buyout funds have been constrained in using the acquired firm’s assets as 
collateral for debt (Bienz et al., 2016). 
Another important aspect of financial engineering is related to the structure of 
incentivization systems (Gompers et al., 2015). The incentive system is enhanced by 
structuring both large equity upside potential but also downside risk. The upside is 
provided through stock and options and bonus programs, whereas the downside risk arises 
due to requiring management to make a meaningful investment in the company from their 
own personal wealth (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018; Biesinger et al., 2020). This mid-to-
long-term upside and downside versus short term risk symmetry was hardly existent in 
public firms in the early 1980s (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). As management cannot sell its 
equity nor exercise its options until after exit, it mitigates biases towards short-term 
performance, and ensures focus on long term objectives, substantially lowering agency costs 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009).  
Overall, while the impact of debt on performance is debated, there seems to be academic 
consensus on the positive relationship between management actions and the incentive 
benefits. Even though public companies have introduced somewhat stronger incentives to 
managers, the incentives introduced by PE investors appear more forceful and better 
structured to help mitigate the agency cost between owners and management post-buyout, 
which is further associated with increased performance (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Lastly, 
as leverage has a pejorative connotation, most practitioners argue that most of the value 
creation is achieved through operational transformation. Nonetheless, LBOs occur more 
often when debt cost is low, and conversely, fewer LBOs when debt costs are high, which 
advocates that the debt-part of financial engineering is an important lever in the private 
equity business model (Phalippou, 2019; Loualiche et al., 2016). Yet, overall, there has been 
a substantial decrease in leverage in buyouts, especially compared to the leverage ratios in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Guo et al., 2011; Gompers et al., 2016). Lastly, Guo et al. (2011) 
argues that the more certain you are that what you are buying is cheap, the more leverage 
you should use. Hence, since buying cheap has become more difficult, the degree of 
leverage in buyouts has decreased (Guo et al., 2011). 
    
3.1.2 Governance Engineering 
Since PE investors usually buy a large stake in their portfolio companies, they often obtain 
voting control. This allows PE firms to conduct governance engineering (Døskeland & 
Strömberg, 2018). Governance engineering refers to how the private equity firms impact the 
portfolio companies’ corporate governance processes, including the role, composition, and 
priorities of the boards, the management team, and focus and design of strategic and 
operational management processes (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). In comparison, in a 
public company, there are numbers of issues that a board of a company cannot resolve upon 
at all, or only with the prior authorization of the general meeting where all shareholders 
exercise their governance rights over the company (BVCA, 2016).  
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) find that PE investors are more actively involved in the 
governance than public company boards, where several studies conclude that active 
monitoring and involvement contribute to enhanced performance (Cotter & Peck, 2001; 
Cornelli & Karakas, 2008; Guo et al., 2011). Furthermore, according to Gertner & Kaplan 
(1996), Acharya & Kehoe (2008) and Cornelli & Karakas (2012), private equity-owned 
companies have smaller boards than comparable public companies and meet more 
frequently, which is found to be more efficient than larger boards12. Moreover, the boards 
are composed of directors with a mix of former executives, PE investors, and outsiders with 
deep industry and/or functional knowledge and experience. Typically, all board members, 
including the external board members, are invested in the company (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2004, Cornelli et al., 2015). Additionally, PE firms do not only provide high-powered 
equity-linked incentives to management and the board, but often key employees as well. In 
Norway, (Bienz, et al., 2016) studies how the requirement of co-investment among PE fund 
managers affects the acquisition strategy of LBO funds. They show that the co-investment 
induces managers to choose less risky firms and use more leverage. Moreover, if the 
required co-investment is relatively high, the funds become more conservative and tend to 
diversify their capital over a larger number of portfolio firms compared to funds with lower 
co-investment requirements. Hence, we can observe an apparently stringent alignment 
between the agent (GPs) and the principals (LPs). 
 
12 Interestingly, a survey by Kehoe et al. (2008) shows that around 20 UK-based directors who have served on the boards 
of both private and public companies find PE boards overall more effective.  
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Even though corporate governance mechanisms were implemented in the early buyouts as 
well, the mechanisms have evolved and become more operationally focused (Schenkel & 
Strömberg, 2017). The boards are structured and run to effectively deliver on the investment 
thesis, focusing on management’s implementation of structured improvement processes, 
detailed business plans and operational KPIs that are continuously monitored and 
communicated throughout the organization (Schenkel & Strömberg, 2017). Moreover, these 
corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the risk of free cash flow being reinvested in a 
suboptimal manner (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007). Furthermore, private equity firms 
replace around one-third of chief executive officers of acquired firms during the first 100 
days, and two-thirds over a four-year period (Acharya & Kehoe, 2008). In particular, the 
CFO is often replaced as it is a key role to assist the PE fund in its governance and financial 
engineering (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018).  
In sum, although governance mechanisms for public companies have improved relative to 
many firms of the 1980s (Kaplan, 1997), PE firms are found to be more actively involved in 
governance than public company directors and public shareholders. Additionally, PE-backed 
companies show a higher ownership share among board members, managers and key 
employees, of which both are associated with higher performance relative to comparable 
benchmarks (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Acharya & Kehoe, 2008; Gompers, et al., 2015).  
3.1.3 Operational Engineering  
Operational engineering involves actively applying industry and operating expertise to 
improve the value of the firm’s operations (e.g., enhancing productivity, functional expertise 
on lean manufacturing, marketing/sales, strategic repositioning, IT, pricing, supply chain 
management, and working capital management), leading to improved cash flow (Berg & 
Gottschalg, 2005; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Acharya & Kehoe, 2008; von Laskowski, 
2012; Phalippou, 2019).  
The empirical evidence on the operating performance of companies’ post-buyout is largely 
positive. A study of 76 large management buyouts of public companies during the 1980s in 
the US finds that the ratio of operating income to sales increased by 10 to 20 percent, both 
absolute and relative to industry (Kaplan, 1989). The ratio of cash flow13 to sales increased 
 
13 Calculated as operating income less capital expenditures. 
    
by approximately 40 percent. These findings are also coincident with large increases in firm 
value, in absolute and relative terms, and is, according to Jensen (1989), achieved without 
massive layoffs or cuts in R&D expenditures. Other studies covering the first buyout wave 
document significant operating improvements measured in profit margins, sales per 
employee and net working capital (see e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; Lichtenberg & 
Siegel, 1989; Smart & Waldfogel, 1994).  
More recent studies, such as Harris et al. (2005) and Cressy et al. (2007)14 in the UK, 
Boucly et al. (2011)15 in France, and Bergström et al. (2007)16 in Sweden, document that 
LBOs are associated with significant improvements in profitability and revenue growth after 
buyouts. Additionally, Acharya et al. (2013) studied 395 deals exited during the period 1991 
to 2007 in Western Europe made by 37 mature PE houses, documenting higher sales growth 
and operating margins. Lee & Lou (2017)17 find that PE managers successfully cut 
excessive operating working capital in firms taken private. This is mainly achieved through 
reduced cash tied up to inventory, increased inventory turnover, and reduced accounts 
receivables. Additionally, the effect of improved working capital is found more significant 
when PE firms have replaced the CEO or when the firm has lower liquidity (Lee & Lou, 
2017). In Norway, Friedrich (2015) studies the Norwegian PE market by investigating the 
changes firms undergo during the time they are PE-backed relative to non-PE-backed firms. 
Overall, he finds that PE improves the operating performance relative to control firms over 
the three-year period, although not all results are statistically significant. Asset turnover and 
ROA (EBITDA/Assets) improves by 50% and 23%, respectively, over three years post PE-
acquisition.  
Moreover, in 2009, Kaplan & Strömberg stated that, while financial and governance 
engineering were common PE practice by the late 1980s, PE has recently introduced 
operational engineering. This is reflected in most top private equity funds being increasingly 
organized around industries and hiring of professionals with operating backgrounds from the 
 
14 122 private and public LBO deals from 1995 - 2005. Measure: EBIT/assets. 
15 839 buyouts between 1994 - 2004. 36 public-to-private, rest is private-to-private.  
16 69 Private-to-private LBOs. Measure: sales growth, EBITDA growth and return on invested capital. 
17 117 LBOs in the US between 1990 - 2015. 
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relevant industry. According to recent studies, the financial crisis sparked the focus on 
operational engineering, where a UK study found that PE-backed portfolio companies 
relative to non-PE backed peers gained 8% higher market share during the crisis and 
attracted 6% more in investments (normalized to assets) in the post-crisis period (Gianfrate 
& Loewenthal, 2015; Bernstein et al., 2017; Jordaan, 2018). Moreover, the intensified 
industry and operational focus often comprise specific value creation plans (Cressy et al., 
2007; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Biesinger et al., 2020). These plans may for example 
include top-line growth, cost-cutting opportunities, strategic changes or repositioning, and 
acquisition opportunities, thus covering both organic and inorganic initiatives to boost 
operating performance. Similar to Kaplan & Strömberg (2009), Hammer et al. (2020)18 also 
finds that value creation has increasingly turned towards operational focus and growth-
related measures. Besides, a survey of GPs by Gompers et al. (2016) reveals that 97% of the 
PE firms report operational improvement as a major driver for their investment returns. 
Research documents that private equity achieves a positive effect on operating performance. 
Nevertheless, recent studies by Guo et al. (2011)19 and Cohn et al. (2014)20, find that gains 
in operating performance are either comparable or slightly exceed those observed for 
benchmark firms matched on industry and pre-buyout characteristics. Hence, the relative 
differences in cash flow gains are significantly reduced compared to the deals documented 
from the 1980s buyout wave by Kaplan (1989). Moreover, a comprehensive study of 183 
US public-to-private LBOs finds no robust evidence of post-buyout improvements after 
adjusting for accounting-induced distortions in empirical measures of operating performance 
(Ayash & Schütt, 2016)21. In the UK, Acharya & Kehoe (2008) and Weir et al. (2007) find 
similar results in operating performance during the same period. Meanwhile, Weir et al. 
 
18 Based on a sample of 788 PE-backed firms and a matched control group of 6.652 non-PE-backed peers between 1997-
2015 in Europe. 
19 94 public-to-private LBOs between 1990 - 2006. Measures: EBITDA scaled by assets or sales, and operating cash flow 
minus capex scaled by assets or sales. 
20 317 US LBOs between 1995 - 2007. Measures: tax EBIT scaled by sales, assets or adjusted by a cost of capital charge. 
21 Use EBITDA adjusted for restructuring charges and scaled by tangible assets to deal with the premium paid which 
affects the balance sheet of the target firm’s assets - which otherwise, mechanically, creates an upward bias into LBO 
targets’ performance measures. More specifically, they use a return-on-tangible-assets measure instead of return on assets 
(ROA), and compare both measures to a propensity score matched control group. For ROA they find some evidence of 
improvements, while no improvements with their more unbiased and conservative measure.  
    
(2015)22 document a significant decline in operating performance. The combination of 
modest operating improvements and high investor returns coincides with Døskeland & 
Strömberg (2018) stating that (more recent) buyouts are usually not about turning 
unprofitable companies around, but rather about a “good-to-great” or “small-to-large” model 
and improving already profitable companies through efficiency improvements. This appears 
to leave less room for improved performance. In essence, this is also suggested by Acharya 
& Kehoe (2008), Weir et al. (2007) and Guo et al. (2008).  
Additionally, an interesting micro study of the operational consequences of private equity in 
the restaurant industry in Florida finds that restaurants become cleaner, safer, and better 
maintained once they are PE-held (Bernstein & Sheen, 2013). Without observing store-level 
financial information following the PE-buyout, this study finds that store closure risk 
declines after PE-entry. These findings are consistent with a large study by Bloom et al., 
(2009) who surveyed over 4,000 firms in the US, Europe and Asia and found that PE-
backed firms are on average the best managed group in the sample. Moreover, Agrawal & 
Tambe (2016) document that PE-held companies train their employees more by tracking the 
long-run career paths of individual workers who are employed by PE targets during an 










22 138 public-to-private LBOs from 1998 - 2004. Measure: EBITDA/Assets (ROA). 
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Figure IV – Levers to Value Creation 
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To summarize, a large literature, starting with Jensen (1986, 1989), Kaplan (1989) and 
Smith (1990), documents how PE ownership impacts the performance of portfolio 
companies. Over various time periods, empirical research shows that the interplay and 
overlap between financial, governance and operational engineering (see Figure IV for 
overview) have all been important levers to operational value creation in PE. Meanwhile, we 
can find some mixed and somewhat conflicting results when it comes to operating 
improvements in more recent research, showing that the operating and efficiency 
improvements are marginally higher, or broadly in line with, or even worse than industry 
peers (Guo et al., 2011; Acharya, 2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Weir et al., 2015; Ayash & 
Schütt, 2016). The majority of the same literature suggests that the time-inconsistent results 
are due to a decline in value creation opportunities over time. A possible explanation to this 
is that better governance mechanisms have become more widely used, thus diminishing the 
impact of the initial buyout innovation by reducing high agency costs (Lerner & Cao, 2009; 
Guo et al., 2011; Weir et al., 2015). Similarly, Jensen (2007) was puzzled by the fact that all 
of the techniques that PE uses to accomplish value creation can be adopted by most public 
companies, yet it does not happen. Seemingly, the market has gradually responded to what 
Jensen (2007) remarks. As the market has matured and become more competitive, the 
    
financial and governance engineering have simultaneously become more or less common 
practice and broadly commoditized (Guo et al., 2011; Kaplan, 1997). Meanwhile, 
operational engineering is more difficult to imitate and acquire as it requires skills, 
capabilities and resources of which many are time-extensive, such as industry-expertise, 
experience and networks (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). Hence, operational engineering 
has become a key skill for PE investors to continue to add value to their investments and 
over the long run manage to generate positive relative returns to their investors.   
3.2 PE Deal Types, Strategic Focus and Specialization 
Effects  
In this section, we review literature on some of the structural changes in the PE industry 
related to value creation. More specifically within deal types, the increasingly popular buy-
and-build strategy as well as describing the strategic focus, and lastly the specialization 
effect. 
Private-to-Private vs. Public-to-Private  
The previously popular delisting of mature and large companies, i.e., public-to-private 
transactions, have fallen out of favor relative to private-to-private buyouts. Private-to-
private buyouts and particularly Secondaries have increased significantly over the last two 
decades and typically actively pursue and engage in growth opportunities (Hammer et al., 
2017).  
A large body of research has been focused on this industry shift. For instance, in France, 
Boucly et al. (2011) find that private-to-private buyouts generate a greater improvement in 
ROA than public-to-private buyouts. Cohn et al. (2016; 2014), and Bansraj et al. (2019) also 
find evidence of superior relative performance of private-to-private buyouts in the US 
(1995-2009) and Europe (1997-2016) compared to public-to-private buyouts. Morris & 
Phalippou (2020) suggest that the shift from public to private buyouts could reflect the fact 
that private equity applies different levers in a private-to-private buyout, such as access to 
capital and management skills and experience, compared to the public-to-private buyouts 
that Jensen (1989) researched. Additionally, it may reflect the fact that private equity is 
focusing more on growth capital and less on mature companies compared to the initial 
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buyout wave. This is in line with Hammer et al.’s (2017) and Boucly et al.’s (2011) 
findings, showing that public-to-private buyouts are not driven by growth opportunities.  
Secondaries 
Moreover, increasing from 2% of global transaction value during the late 1980s to 25% in 
2005, the surge of secondary buyouts has been a distinct part of the worldwide PE market 
development (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Firstly, it has resulted in an increase of the total 
time period in which portfolio companies are owned by private equity funds. As such, the 
individual holding periods underestimate the total holding period in private ownership. 
When accounting for this, Strömberg (2008) shows that the median PE ownership period is 
nine years after the original buyout transaction. In a study by Kaplan (1991), he found that 
the median LBO ownership period was slightly below seven years.  
Jenkinson & Sousa (2011) and Achleitner & Figge (2011) study the economic value-added 
activities of private equity firms in secondaries. By comparing 308 European firms exited 
through a secondary or an IPO between 2000-2007, they find that the operating performance 
of IPO firms clearly outperform secondary firms in terms of sales and EBITDA during the 
first (full) three years post exit. However, they find that secondary firms increase their net 
cash flow23 significantly more than IPO firms, mainly due to a reduction in capex. Similarly, 
Bonini (2010) finds that the operating performance of the companies is only slightly 
improved in the SBO compared to industry benchmarks, whereas the first buyout shows 
significant improvement24. Furthermore, Jenkinson & Sousa (2011) identify a negative 
relationship between the holding period in the first PE holding period and the secondary 
deal performance, and also suggest the secondary PE firm’s lesser experience as possible 
explanations for underperformance compared to IPO firms. Overall, Jenkinson & Sousa 
(2011) find it premature to conclude that the increase in secondary buyouts, i.e., lengthened 
total PE ownership period, implies that PE is a superior long-term organizational form. 
Achleitner & Figge (2011) on the other hand, find no robust evidence that SBOs generate 
lower equity returns or offer lower operational value creation potential in their sample of 
910 realized buyouts transactions, including 115 SBOs between 1985 and 2006. But they 
 
23 Calculated as EBITDA minus CAPEX. 
24 Bonini’s analysis focuses on a very short performance window of one year prior and post transaction. Thus, it likely 
captures low hanging fruit, but does not adequately assess the actual realized performance over the total holding period. 
    
document that SBOs acquire more leverage than primary buyouts (even after controlling for 
debt market conditions), which they suggest can be driven by lower informational 
asymmetries in an SBO. Similar to Wang (2010), they also find evidence of SBOs being 
more expensive than other buyouts. Contrary to Jenkinson & Sousa (2011), Achleitner & 
Figge (2011) concludes that SBOs are no second-rate deals, documenting equity returns and 
operating improvements comparable to primary buyouts. Lastly, secondary buyouts 
frequently exploit unused inorganic growth potential through add-on acquisitions, 
commonly referred to as Buy-and-Builds, which will be discussed below, implying that the 
strategy is a key value creation lever in secondary buyouts (Jansen et al., 2016, Hammer et 
al., 2017).   
Buy-and-Builds and Strategic Focus 
The development of the buyout industry includes the development of several value creation 
strategies since the Classic LBO during the 1980s (Ayash & Bartlett, 2017). In a study of 92 
fully monetized LBOs occurring between 1995 and 2008 in the US, Ayash & Bartlett (2017) 
suggest that PE firms have developed transaction strategies that aim to produce equity 
returns through aggressively growing revenues, often through multiple 
acquisitions. Moreover, The Boston Consulting Groups suggests that the use of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) has become the single most important way to improve operation in PE 
buyouts (BCG, 2012).  
The application of “buy-and-build” strategies has increased substantially in the PE 
market and comprises around 30% of the overall European PE deal market (Hammer et al., 
2017; Smit et al., 2020). The strategy relies on using the initial portfolio company as a 
platform for subsequent add-on acquisitions during the holding period to accelerate revenue 
growth and drive margin expansion by realizing synergies (Hammer et al., 2020). The 
combination of multiple companies within a single company targets skill and scale based 
operating efficiency improvements, provided that the acquiring firm can successfully 
integrate the combined firms’ operations (Ayash & Bartlett, 2017). Among the sample of 
788 PE-backed firms, Hammer et al. (2020) finds that PE-backed companies realize 
acquisitions faster and increase the expected number of acquisitions by roughly 90%. In a 
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sub-sample of 278 PE buyouts25, they find that every add-on acquisition increases the EV 
growth rate by 3.5% p.a., expands the EV/EBITDA multiple by 15.7% and the portfolio 
company’s operating margin by 1.6%, documenting that add-on acquisitions create value on 
average.  
A study of 818 buy-and-build strategies from seven European markets (including Norway) 
over 1997-2016, finds that the average holding period is more than five years longer than for 
a typical LBO (Smit et al., 2020). They also find that the significant synergies through 
higher sales materialize in year 4 and 5, while profitability increases throughout, and the 
impact scales over time. The buy-and-build strategy focuses more on long term growth and 
synergies and less on value creation from traditional LBOs, such as tax shield and 
restructuring (Smit et al., 2020). Interestingly, the Created Value Attribution framework 
developed by Duff & Phelps (2014) applied to 28 individual transactions in North 
America26, finds that 62% of the enterprise value creation stems from revenue growth and 
almost 90% of average revenue growth across the sample was driven by industry 
performance or add-on acquisitions, while the remaining 10% was attributed to organic 
market share gains.  
In another recent study, 76 private equity firms answered that the most important sources to 
adding value are, in ranked order; increasing revenue, improving incentives and governance, 
facilitating a high-value exit, making additional acquisitions, replacing management and 
reducing costs (Gompers et al., 2015). A comprehensive study of 1.580 emerging markets 
deals by 171 PE funds raised between 1992 and 2017 attempts to break down the value 
creation in portfolio companies into so-called Value Creation Plans (VCPs) (Biesinger et 
al., 2020). The two most popular strategies are operational improvements and top-line 
growth, and the three most popular combinations involve operational improvements and 
top-line growth, either with no other strategy or in combination with governance 
engineering, or with both governance and financial engineering. Interestingly, they find that 
the popularity of top-line growth and governance engineering strategies increases as the 
maturity of deals increases (Biensinger et al., 2020).  
 
25 Comprising deal EVs at entry and exit, sales and EBITDA. 
26  See Created Value Attribution (INSEAD) p. 11. 
    
Specialists vs. Generalists 
The relationship between PE specialization (defined by the GP’s industry and stage focus) 
and PE portfolio company performance has been examined in several empirical studies. 
Cressy et al. (2007) concludes in a study of 122 UK buyouts over the period 1995 - 2002 
that, in addition to portfolio companies in general outperforming comparable companies by 
4.5% post-buyout, industry specialization of PE firms adds 8.5% to this premium, consistent 
with the industry specialization hypothesis. However, other findings related to the 
specialization effect are less conclusive. Aigner et al. (2008) analyzed the performance of 
104 PE funds with approximately 55% US and 45% European portfolio company 
investments. In line with Ljungqvist & Richards (2003), Lossen (2007), and Brigl et al. 
(2008), Aigner et al. (2008) could not find any significant relationship between portfolio 
company returns and the level of specialization of the PE manager. Lossen’s (2007) findings 
led him to the conclusion that the advantages of PE specialization in particular industries to 
overcome information asymmetries and principal agent problems could be limited. PE funds 
are often specialized within their organization (Aigner et al., 2008) suggesting there might 
be experts for the different financing stages and industries who, together, create 
specialization within GPs which are classified as generalists. 
Although VC is outside the scope of this thesis, Norton & Tenenbaum (1993) examined 
whether VCs attempt to control risk through competing portfolio strategies. In contrast to 
traditional finance theory, which suggests that portfolio diversification reduces unsystematic 
risk, the authors argue that VCs seem to benefit from the opposite. Their research suggests 
that VCs control portfolio risk by specializing in certain industries and financing stages, 
rather than stagger their investments over different industries and stages. In addition, Norton 
& Tenenbaum (1993) find evidence that these firms experience higher returns than 
comparable non-specialized VCs due to extensive technical and product expertise in their 
area of specialization. These findings are supported by Gompers et al. (2008). In their 
sample of 2.179 U.S. VCs investing in 16.140 companies, Gompers et al. (2008) find 
evidence that specialized VCs with greater industry-specific experience and human capital 
tend to respond more quickly to new investment opportunities. In addition, these 
investments tend to be more successful compared to investments of less experienced VCs, 
measured by a greater likelihood of profitable exit (i.e. IPO, acquisition, merger). Overall, 
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these papers support the specialization hypothesis, which proposes a negative relationship 
between the level of diversification and the rate of return. 
To summarize, the surge in buy-and-builds as well as increasing strategic focus on 
operational improvements are levers leveraged by PE managers in order to remain 
competitive and deliver positive returns. Thus, PE firms have developed new ways to add 
value to their portfolio companies involving growth strategies and holding companies for 
longer periods (Smit el al., 2020) in response to the significant growth of the industry since 
the mid-1990s, ensued by increased competition and pressure (Cressy et al., 
2007). Noteworthy, some have criticized PE for simply shifting profits from other 
stakeholders, such as employees and customers, to its shareholders, GP short-termism and 
asset-stripping, negatively affecting long-term performance (see e.g. Lowenstein, 1985; 
Shleifer & Summers, 1988 and Elliot, 2007). Yet, there is no substantial empirical literature 
that finds evidence to support these claims (Døskeland & Strömberg, 2018). That is, the 
apparent value creation does not seem to be at the expense of other stakeholders or long-
term profitability. Moreover, Døskeland & Strömberg (2018) points out that, although 
Jensen’s (1989) prediction of the extinction of the public corporation might have been 
premature, his arguments help explain the dramatic growth of the PE market over the 
following three decades. During the same period, private equity has been a very active 
research field within finance, including a multitude of later empirical studies that both 
confirms but also refutes many of Jensen’s conjectures. In sum, the substantial body of 
empirical research on value creation in private equity on company-level with various, but 
also conflicting findings, makes our paper even more interesting. 
    
4. Empirical Research  
Our research objective is to evaluate and understand the operating performance of 
Norwegian PE portfolio companies relative to the operating performance of similar 
companies. Thus, we seek to provide insights on whether PE-backed companies experience 
improvements in the post-buyout operating performance compared to non-PE-backed 
companies. We further analyze potential differences in performance between portfolio 
companies owned by specialized and generalist PE firms, and differences in performance 
among deal types. Academic research focusing on the operating performance of PE buyouts 
(Kaplan, 1989; Bergström et al., 2007; Cressy et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 
2012; Alperovych et al., 2013, Ayash & Schütt, 2016) provides useful insights into setting 
up an appropriate research methodology which is largely reflected in this study’s research 
design. Still, to generate valid insights we find it critical that the specifics of the local PE 
market, including accounting standards and data availabilities, and the characteristics of the 
sample itself, is reflected in our research design.  
This chapter provides a detailed description of the overall research design and the research 
model including PE portfolio company data input, definition of the operating performance 
metrics, construction of the control group, empirical set-up and methodology, before the two 
following chapters present the results and conclusions, respectively.   
4.1 Research Design  
The research objective is to assess operational improvements in portfolio companies that are 
in excess of any general improvements in operating performance of the respective 
companies’ industry peers. Furthermore, we attempt to identify potential underlying 
explanatory factors for differences in performance including degree of specialization of the 
PE company and deal sources. More specifically, we are testing the following three main 
hypotheses:    
Hypothesis 1:   Private Equity ownership has a positive (relative) impact on 
operating performance 
Hypothesis 2:   There is a positive relationship between PE fund’s degree of 
specialization by industry and performance post-buyout 
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Hypothesis 3:   PE Portfolio company performance varies by deal type 
In order to test these hypotheses, we track performance measures on operating profitability 
and turnover growth from one year pre-acquisition up to five years post-acquisition and all 
the way to exit or last accessible accounting year for companies still private. More 
specifically, we measure operating profitability using return on assets (ROA, measured as 
EBITDA/total assets) and decompose ROA into its subcomponents; return on sales (ROS = 
EBITDA/sales) and asset turnover (sales/total assets). We further analyze growth in sales, 
EBITDA and (net) working capital improvements. When testing the main research question 
whether PE portfolio companies outperform non-PE backed companies, the operating 
performance will be benchmarked against a control group determined by applying 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The test is designed to analyze what the counterfactual 
performance of the PE portfolio companies would have been if they were not acquired by 
PE investors.  
4.2 Data  
As pointed out by previous research on PE in Norway, (see e.g., Bienz et al., 2016; 
Friedrich, 2015), private equity practices such as implementation of new holding companies, 
consolidation of portfolio companies, changes in organizational numbers and renaming of 
companies when acquiring new companies, introduce significant challenges within the 
research design. As a consequence, Friedrich (2015) and most of the previous research on 
Nordic PE portfolio companies, match the control group on the buyout year of the company, 
due to new ownership structures and lack of data and information. We have, however, 
chosen to dedicate required efforts to apply pre-buyout data in our analysis to match and 
construct the control group. With extensive research in several databases, we have been able 
to obtain company financials pre-buyout and transaction information (we provide a thorough 
discussion about why we have fixated on gathering data pre-buyout and the considerable 
limitations of matching on the year of buyout in the method section). Noteworthy, the 
databases on buyout activity also require considerable work to ensure a robust link between 
data, analyses and findings. Most of the previous research in this field is not very transparent 
on how these issues have been addressed. We have also chosen to dedicate significant 
efforts to ensure that the quality of the data which are applied generate robust findings. 
    
4.2.1 Databases Applied 
The empirical tests of this thesis require a large amount of detailed data on the PE portfolio 
companies. Annual accounting data for the PE portfolio companies and the control group 
are retrieved from a database based on data from Brønnøysundregistrene which has been 
created by the Centre for Applied Research at NHH (SNF) and revised by Mjøs, Berner and 
Olving (2016). The database contains company and consolidated accounts for all Norwegian 
enterprises and groups from 1992-2018.   
Our dataset on PE portfolio companies is based on a database provided by the Argentum 
Centre for Private Equity (ACPE). ACPE is an independent research centre at NHH in 
collaboration with Argentum, HitecVision, Energy Ventures, PWC, Norvestor Equity, 
Northzone and BA-HR focused on Nordic Private Equity. The ACPE database covers most 
PE transactions in the Nordics from 1991 to 2015 and provides us with an initial set of 319 
buyouts of Norwegian companies and 300 transactions made post 2000 which is the time 
period focus of this study.   
These transactions include data on several parameters such as the name of the portfolio 
company and the corresponding organizational number, industry, PE fund manager, fund 
and fund ownership share, investment stage, investment date, transaction size, exit date and 
exit type. However, much of the information is missing or is misclassified which requires an 
extensive and time-consuming task in manually collecting and cross-referencing the 
required data for our analysis. For instance, the investment date is specified for 142 of 300 
transactions, and the sample would have been reduced to only 36 transactions if we 
excluded those without a specified exit date underscoring the need for such extensive and 
manual tasks to obtain a statistically robust sample. 
The ACPE database is therefore combined and complemented with a similar database 
provided by Menon Economics in order to extend our sample. Even though the data 
challenges of the ACPE database apply to this database as well, it allows us to calibrate 
especially data related to organizational numbers. Furthermore, the original database is 
complemented by a list of transactions and corresponding data received directly from 
Argentum. The list from Argentum is particularly useful to identify exit date and exit type 
for transactions exited after 2015, as the ACPE database is not updated after 2015. Buyouts 
occurring after 2015 are not included in the sample, since at least 3 years of post-buyout 
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operating performance is required to conduct a meaningful analysis, and financial 
statements after 2018 are not available in the SNF database. In total, 58 deals were added to 
the initial data from ACPE. 
Missing transaction data such as entry date, exit date, entry and exit type is collected and 
validated through meticulous analysis of company descriptions and transaction info in 
databases such as Valu8, Factset, Orbis, PE manager’s web pages as well as press releases. 
4.2.2 Data Due Diligence  
The resulting database after combining the data from the mentioned accounting and 
transaction database sources as well as data extracted from the latter mentioned sources, 
requires careful review. Firstly, we make sure that no transactions are included more than 
once. This is a delicate task, since quite a few transactions and corresponding organizational 
numbers refers to a holding company or group that includes several subsidiaries which are 
identified as independent PE transactions in the database. These subsidiaries are typically 
first acquired by the PE company and then later on incorporated into a holding company or 
group or merged with other portfolio companies. The database would then account for both 
the group of subsidiaries by providing the name and organizational number of the 
consolidated (holding) company and the names and organizational numbers of the 
subsidiaries. Hence, to avoid double sampling these transactions and the corresponding 
performance of these portfolio companies in our data sample, the historical holding structure 
of the portfolio companies must be examined. For this purpose, we use the SNF database’s 
registry over corporations (“foretaksdata”) where subsidiaries are linked to their holding 
company, complemented with Valu8. 
Alterations to The Original Database  
Steps to avoid double counting of transactions: Follow-on investments (by the same PE 
company) are excluded. Only the initial transaction is included and joint investments by 
different PE companies are treated as one transaction. Secondary transactions are included if 
they are not within the relevant period of measurement of the prior PE transaction. This is 
because secondaries are an increasingly common entry strategy and excluding these would 
induce risk of losing an important aspect of PE’s investment activity. 
    
Steps to ensure correct classifications of PE vs other types of investments: Some 
transactions reported as buyouts are venture capital investments, seed investments or passive 
private placements, and are therefore eliminated. Distinguishing between venture capital, 
private placements and PE transactions is sometimes challenging. These cases need to be 
evaluated on an individual basis, based on parameters such as ownership stake, transaction 
size and maturity of the company. Stakes in public companies that remain publicly traded 
(PIPES) are evaluated on the same basis and are included if they are active investments by a 
PE company.  
Steps to exclude non-PE sponsors: Following the above-mentioned logic, transactions 
conducted by pure venture capital companies such as Maturo are excluded, as these are 
likely VC investments. Moreover, transactions conducted by family investment offices such 
as Kistefos are also excluded. Even though such offices are active owners, their models 
differ to traditional PE models regarding ownership period, exit requirement and active 
ownership processes. However, family offices with a clear PE model as a line of investment 
activity, such as Ferd, are regarded as PE, and hence their transactions are included in the 
sample.  
Steps to exclude infrastructure-like deals: Transactions within infrastructure and asset-
intensive sectors such as shipping and oil are also disregarded (suppliers to these industries 
are however included), since these deals are mostly not driven by operational improvement, 
but largely driven by external factors such as commodity prices, freight rates etc. Measuring 
such asset-intensive companies in terms of operational metrics such as EBITDA/assets is 
not purposeful and can distort the sample.   
Steps to capture PE deals with robust yearly accounting time series: Our analysis is 
restricted to portfolio companies which have pre- and post-buyout financial statements 
available. Consequently, the organizational number of the target entity needs to be identified 
to retrieve its financial statements for the year(s) prior to acquisition as well as for the 
holding period. This task is complicated by the fact that many PE companies change the 
ownership structure of the portfolio companies upon acquisition or during the ownership. 
For instance, PE companies often establish a new holding company upon acquisition of a 
company. Hence, the organizational numbers of both the new and the old holding company 
have to be identified and validated so that they do not differ in terms of businesses 
controlled as a prerequisite for using consolidated figures on holding level to compare pre- 
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and post-buyout performance. Using consolidated figures for the holding company is 
necessary if: 1) the relevant portfolio company comprises a group, and 2) consolidated 
figures are not available for the group/parent company or any of its subsidiaries. Using 
unconsolidated figures can create distortions for several reasons. Firstly, if the portfolio 
company comprises a group, the unconsolidated financial statements of one subsidiary does 
not reflect the operational performance of the whole group, or they might be severely 
misleading as they can include internal transfers and payments from one subsidiary to 
another. Secondly, in some cases the “main operating” subsidiary of the portfolio company 
changes after PE entry due to changes in ownership structure, or add-on 
acquisitions/mergers which make the financial statements of this subsidiary no longer 
representative of the performance of the portfolio company. In other cases, the PE company 
splits the acquired portfolio company into separate companies, meaning that the pre- and 
post-buyout performance of the portfolio company is not comparable on an unconsolidated 
basis.  
However, the mentioned databases often provide the organizational number of an 
unconsolidated subsidiary within the portfolio company. Using unconsolidated figures (for 
the subsidiary) is appropriate, provided that the portfolio company does not comprise a 
group, or that the other subsidiaries in the group are negligible. This is not always the case 
in the databases, as many of the organizational numbers refer to unconsolidated subsidiaries 
that are not representative for the operating performance of the entire portfolio company. 
The group or holding company is identified by matching on the organizational number of 
the subsidiary in the SNF database’s registry of companies and corresponding 
parent/holding companies, which is manually verified in Valu8. Sometimes the 
organizational number is missing, or they refer to target companies that had changed the 
organizational number (and often name) upon acquisition. In such cases, the organizational 
number is identified manually in the SNF database by matching on company name at the 
time of PE entry identified through press releases and M&A databases such as Factset, 
Valu8 and Mergr. 
In summary, tracking the performance of PE portfolio companies, and more specifically 
tracking the performance of the right PE portfolio companies over time is a complex task. 
This complexity is further enhanced by the switching between providing consolidated and 
    
non-consolidated figures and between subsidiaries and holding companies from year to 
year.  
The above issues lead us to the conclusion that validating the organizational numbers of the 
ACPE database is necessary to avoid serious distortions to the “true” performance of the PE 
backed portfolio companies. Furthermore, a significant number of observations would be 
lost to factors such as 1) the organizational number is completely missing, and 2) the 
relevant organizational number has changed so corresponding accounting information is not 
available. Identifying and validating the correct portfolio company and corresponding 
organizational number for each transaction is therefore crucial to conduct a statistically 
meaningful analysis of their performance. We approach this challenge by looking up 
historical ownership structures for the portfolio companies in the SNF database, Valu8 and 
Orbis and identifying the holding company or parent/subsidiary with consolidated figures 
for the group where financial statements are available for the entire period of measurement 
and is directly comparable to the acquired entity. If consolidated figures are not available for 
the relevant period of measurement, we use unconsolidated figures for the subsidiary 
provided it reflects the operations of the (entire) portfolio company. In order to evaluate the 
representativeness of using unconsolidated subsidiaries as a proxy for the group/portfolio 
company, we calibrate the respective accounting information with other sources such as 
press-releases, webpages of respective PE companies, Valu8, Factset and Orbis. This 
process must be conducted to identify and validate the organizational number of the target 
company both pre- and post-acquisition to ensure that we match the control group with the 
company that was de facto acquired. 
This process led to the exclusion of transactions where we were not able to identify the 
correct organizational numbers or the organizational numbers had disappeared. The 
disappearance of organizational numbers can occur for various reasons. One is bankruptcy. 
Another is when various parts of the original company are acquired by multiple companies, 
and the legal entity ceases to exist and has no obvious successor (Davis et al., 2019). This 
makes it inherently difficult to define and measure changes in the performance of such 
companies (Davis et al., 2019), and they are therefore excluded from our sample. Finally, 
only buyouts of companies with complete accounting information for at least one year post-
buyout are included in the final sample. 
 42 
4.2.3 Sample Description  
Our final sample consists of 214 buyouts between 2000 and 2015, out of the total sample of 
358 deals gathered from the two databases from ACPE and Menon Economics (see Figure 
V). The sample includes 49 different private equity companies. The eight most active in the 
sample are Herkules (26 transactions), HitecVision (24 transactions), Norvestor and Reiten 
& Co. Capital Partners (both with 17 transactions), and Altor (14 transactions), followed by 
FSN, EQT and CapMan (all with 9 transactions). 
Figure V – Sample PE Entries and Exits by Year 
Figure V depicts sample exits and entries by year. Entries post 2015 are not included as accounting figures are 
limited to fiscal 2018, and minimum 3 years of post-buyout data are deemed necessary. As of February 2021, 
45 investments in our sample are still private. 
Like Davis et al. (2019), we sort the sample of buyouts into four main deal types: the buyout 
of an independent, privately held company (private-to-private), the buyout of a publicly 
listed company (public-to-private), the buyout of a part of a company (divisional buyout), 
and the sale of a portfolio company from one PE company to another (secondary buyout). 
Additionally, we have included private investments in public equity (PIPES). Exit type is 
classified based on the buyer of the portfolio company. Industry and Sector are classified 
according to Capital IQ’s classification framework to ensure a direct link between our 
sample and the PE companies’ distribution of investments along Industry retrieved from 
Capital IQ.  
    
Table I depicts the sample distribution of buyouts along industry and investment year. The 
table shows that Industrials and Consumer are the two most frequent/popular industries in 
which the portfolio company operates, followed by Energy and Information Technology, 
respectively. 
The distribution of buyouts along deal type and year is depicted in Table II. Importantly, we 
see that the distribution conveys variation both in deal type and total number of deals over 
time, for instance in 2009 only 8 deals occurred, arguably as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. This is in accordance with Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) stating that timing of 
investments is also an important factor in PE. Hence, expectedly, the PE industry has a 
cyclicality factor that likely impacts the performance post-buyout which needs to be 
accounted for in the analysis. Notably, we see that private-to-private buyouts, i.e., private 
companies being acquired by private equity investors, clearly dominates our sample, 
corresponding to the findings in Bienz et al. (2016).  
Table III depicts the frequency of exit types and the corresponding average and median 
holding period to each exit. The average (median) holding period for the transactions exited 
in our sample is 6.3 (5.8) years. This is somewhat higher than previous findings by Kamlund 
& Knudsen (2018) on Nordic PE deals between 2000-2016, reporting an average holding 
period of 5.3 years27. This might suggest that the average holding period in Norway has 
increased. However, the longer holding period might be attributable to a skewness in the 
holding period of our sample compared to the population of buyout deals in Norway as the 
performance of some particularly early exited investments are not measurable and they are 
hence excluded from the final sample. Furthermore, the holding periods are calculated from 
entry to complete divestment. 
 
27 Additionally, Degorge et al. (2015) reports an average holding period of 4.4 years for 5,849 buyouts between 1986-2007. 
Interestingly, Jenkinson & Sousa (2015) find different holding periods for deal types, reporting an average holding period 
of 4.4 years for secondary buyouts and 3.7 years for IPOs in the European deal market. 
Table I - Buyout Distribution by Industry and Investment Year 
 
Table I provides an overview of the buyouts distributed by entry year and industry. The industry classifications are retrieved from Capital IQ, where Consumer Goods and 
Consumer Staples are merged into the category Consumer. The industry in Norway that received the most PE investments (both follow-up and initial) in 2019 was ICT (NOK 
16.7 bn), followed by petroleum (NOK 7.7 bn), business related services and industry services (NOK 3.9 bn), financial services (NOK 1.4 bn), retail/consumer (NOK 610 
mil), business related products and industry products (NOK 530 mil), and lastly, other energy sources, life science, construction and fishery and aquaculture, all equal to or 
below NOK 100 mil (NVCA, 2020). Compared to the Nordics, Norway is less diversified and relies more heavily upon offshore and energy related businesses (BVCA, 2016). 
However, while petroleum was the largest represented sector in PE funds combined portfolio of Norwegian companies a decade ago (in NOK), it has recently been exceeded 
by ICT and retail/consumer (NVCA, 2020). The three sectors combined now dominate the share of the PE funds’ aggregated portfolios. Nearly all sectors have experienced 
growth and positive value creation since 2009, besides petroleum (-21%) and chemicals (-52%). Noteworthy, since 2009, ICT has nearly tripled its value creation contribution 
(NVCA, 2020). Total sample sector distribution can be seen in Figure A.I in the Appendix. 
 
Investment Year 
Industry  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Communication 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 9 
Consumer 0 2 2 2 3 4 10 3 3 2 5 4 4 3 2 3 52 
Energy 0 0 0 2 2 1 5 3 3 2 6 1 1 6 7 3 43 
Financials 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Health Care 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 3 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 16 
Industrials 3 0 0 1 0 3 3 5 6 2 3 5 6 7 5 4 53 
Information Tech. 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 6 2 4 1 6 2 1 3 34 
Materials 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 3 3 3 9 6 11 23 19 21 8 23 12 20 19 20 14 214 
 
 
Table II - Buyout Distribution by Deal Type and Investment Year 
 
This table illustrates the buyout distribution by deal types occurring between 2000 and 2015 for the final sample. Same table is provided as a figure in the Appendix (Figure 
A.II). When it comes to deal types in Norway, Bienz, Thorburn and Walz (2016) finds that most buyouts in Norway are indeed private-to-private transactions. In their sample 
of 62 Norwegian portfolio company investments made by 20 Nordic LBO funds between 2000 and 2010, only two out of the PE transactions were public-to-private (Bienz et 
al., 2016). For the Nordic region, trade sales and secondary transactions account for about two-thirds of the exits, whilst IPOs remain low (BVCA, 2016).  
 
Investment Year 
Deal type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015   Total 
Divisional 0 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 8 2 3 36 
PIPE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 7 
Private-to-private 3 1 0 6 3 7 14 15 15 2 14 7 13 7 9 7 123 
Public-to-private 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 14 
Secondary 0 1 1 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 3 3 4 4 7 3 34 
Total 3 3 3 9 6 11 23 19 21 8 23 12 20 19 20 14 214 
Table III illustrates the distribution of exit types and the corresponding holding period for each type. Total 
holding period is a weighted average and median based on the frequency of each exit type and adjoining 
holding period based on the full sample of 214 buyouts. We have distinguished Secondary from Financial exits 
to separate exits to other PE funds from other financial buyers. The category “Other” predominantly consists of 
HitecVision selling portfolio companies to their own industrial group Moreld, and also includes three other 
transactions where the managers or founders have bought back the company. Note that holding periods are 
computed from entry to complete divestment. Hence, the holding period for IPO outcomes do not correspond to 
the holding period from entry to IPO. For sample distribution by exits overall see Figure A.III in the Appendix.  
Table III - Distribution by Outcome 
 
Exit Type Freq. Percent Years Held (avg.) Years Held (med.) 
Bankruptcy 13 6.2 7.1 6.4 
IPO 16 7.7 7.2 6.8 
Not exited 43 20.6 8.0 7.5 
Other 11 4.8 8.1 7.2 
Other Financial Buyer 16 7.2 6.5 5.4 
Secondary 53 24.9 5.9 5.4 
Strategic Buyer 62 28.7 5.8 5.5 
Total 214 100.00 6.6 6.1 
 
A possible bias source that could potentially affect the sample is the early exit of portfolio 
companies. Particularly underperforming companies might be exited early due to 
bankruptcy, while overperforming companies might be exited early due to an IPO or an 
acquisition. If accounting data is not available for at least 1 year post-buyout, the transaction 
is excluded. To control for the potential upward bias of early bankruptcy, we have identified 
the exit date and exit type for all transactions. In total, only 2 portfolio companies are 
bankrupt within 1 year after acquisition out of a total 14 write-offs. The remaining 12 
bankruptcies/write-offs are hence included in the sample as their performance is measurable 
post-buyout. The potential bias of losing 2 bankruptcy transactions is considered negligible. 
In sum, our sample represents PE firms across a wide spectrum of investment strategies, 
size, and industry specialization. Hence, the data consists of a prominent range of different 
firms which are considered to be very robust for capturing the overall PE-ownership effect in 
Norway. In total, the data significantly extends the samples used in previous research on 
Norwegian PE portfolio companies, and it captures a significant part of the buyout activity 
that has occurred in Norway since 2000.  
    
4.3 Operating Performance Metrics  
The best measure of periodic performance in an uncertain world is book yields (Vatter, 
1966; Demsetz, 1997; Peasnell, 1996). Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Net 
Operating Assets (RNOA = NOI/NOA) are two commonly applied book yield measures, 
where NOI is Net Operating Income and NOA is Net Operating Assets. RNOA would likely 
be the ideal measure of operating performance. This is because it allows us to isolate 
operating profitability from leverage effects with corresponding required risk normalization 
adjustments. A decomposition of return on equity, similar to Penman (2013) illustrates this 
point:  
               (1) 
 
                                (2) 
 
Which can be expressed as: ROE = RNOA + [FLEV x SPREAD]28. ROE is here 
decomposed into the part attributable to operating performance (RNOA) and the part 
attributable to financial leverage (the spread between RNOA and net borrowing costs scaled 
by financial leverage)29. 
However, calculating RNOA is challenging without access to detailed accounting 
information (typically from notes in annual reports) as many adjustments such as 
classification of operating versus financial items need to be made depending on the 
respective company’s line of business. Furthermore, NOI takes taxes into account, which 
makes the results less comparable cross-border and to previous literature which 
 
28 Where FLEV is financial leverage and SPREAD is the difference between the return on net operating assets (RNOA) and 
net borrowing costs. 
29 Defined as net financial obligations (NFO). 





predominantly use pre-tax measures (Ayash & Schütt, 2016). Therefore, there are two 
alternative measures that could be applied as a proxy for NOI: EBITDA and EBIT. 
Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is considered the 
best measure of earnings as it is not affected by changes in the capital structure and in 
depreciation, amortization, interest charges and tax payments potentially resulting from a 
levering up of the portfolio company (particularly in LBOs). Within a PE context, measures 
such as net income can mechanically decrease even though the underlying company’s 
operations are unchanged (Phalippou & Morris, 2019). Therefore, PE portfolio companies’ 
net income is not comparable to other privately held companies. EBITDA is also likely the 
best representation of operating cash flows (Phalippou & Morris, 2019). 
As an alternative, Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) takes depreciation and 
amortization into account and ensures that expenses related to investments are captured. 
Kothari et al. (2002) argue that such investment expenses should be taken into account, since 
re-investments are required to sustain operating performance and growth. However, EBIT 
has some considerable limitations in a buyout context, as depreciation and amortization often 
increase post-buyout as a result of accounting-based asset write-ups of fixed tangible assets 
and goodwill to account for the premium paid to acquire the portfolio company (Ayash & 
Schütt, 2016). Thus, the EBIT/Asset ratio will, ceteris paribus, deteriorate post acquisition 
despite unchanged underlying operating performance. EBIT is also vulnerable to differences 
in accounting standards (IFRS versus Norsk Regnskapslov) and depreciation practices. 
Therefore, EBIT has serious shortcomings as a measure of PE operating performance and as 
the research objective of this thesis is to evaluate PE’s operational rather than financial 
engineering performance, we conclude that EBITDA is the most appropriate representation 
of PE portfolio companies’ operating earnings. This conclusion is consistent with the 
consensus in academic literature (see e.g., Phalippou & Morris, 2019; Ayash & Schütt, 
2016).  
Applying EBITDA as a measure requires, however, as outlined above, an asset denominator 
to capture the book yields and the dynamics of either internal (capital expenditure or current 
assets) or external (acquisitions and divestments) investments in PE portfolio companies 
(Phalippou & Morris, 2019). An increasing share of PE transactions are also based on 
growth or buy-and-build strategies where a company is acquired and used as a «platform» 
for consolidating fragmented industries through multiple add-on acquisitions or for building 
    
positions in international markets through acquisitions. There are ways to adjust for these 
dynamics such as applying unconsolidated financial statements for the platform company 
(thereby excluding the impact of add-on acquisitions) or exclude buy-and-build strategies 
from the sample. However, the best methodology advocated in the majority of PE research 
including Phalippou & Morris (2019), is to apply assets in the denominator which is 
consistent with the overall value creation framework outlined in the introduction of this 
section. More specifically, we reflect the capital by scaling EBITDA by Total Assets to 
obtain a ROA measure as a proxy for RNOA.  
Total Assets has, however, some challenges that need to be addressed to obtain a meaningful 
metric for measuring developments in operating performance. A buyout often leads to a “fair 
value step-up” or a “structural break” in the financial statements as the acquisition often 
triggers a revaluation of the portfolio company’s assets from historic cost to fair value30 
(Ayash & Schütt, 2016). More specifically, the PE firm usually pays a premium over a 
company’s net book value in a buyout, and this premium is added to the balance sheet’s 
long-term assets as goodwill. This revaluation of assets creates a discontinuity between pre-
and post-transaction Total Assets, and consequently bias post-buyout ROA downwards 
(Phalippou & Morris, 2019). Most studies, such as Kaplan (1989), Guo et al. (2011) and 
Cohn et al. (2014) address this structural break by grossing up the pre-transaction Total 
Assets number, and typically, goodwill associated with the buyout comprises the majority of 
the difference between the pre- and post-acquisition balance sheet (Ayash & Schütt, 2016). It 
is, however, important to note that including assets in the denominator has some 
disadvantages as the EBITDA/Total Assets metric can be impacted by write-offs and 
amortization of goodwill over time (Ayash & Schütt, 2016) and by differences in accounting 
standards (IFRS vs NGAAP). Methodologies which remove goodwill by applying only 
tangible assets in the denominator as suggested by Ayash & Schütt (2016) is one possible 
solution to address this issue. On the other hand, acquisitions can be considered a substitute 
for organic capital expenditures and not including goodwill would “punish” companies 
pursuing organic capital expenditures and favor acquirers. Hence, this latter approach by 
Ayash & Schütt (2016) introduces a bias of its own. We therefore conclude that the most 
 
30 According to Rskl. §§ 5—14 and 5—19 acquisitions trigger purchase accounting. There are certain exemptions for 
mergers of two equal sized companies where the continuity method can be applied, and the original value of balance sheet 
items is maintained. According to § 5--16 "small enterprises" ("små foretak") can maintain assets at balance sheet values. 
The same principles apply for IFRS (for consolidated accounts). 
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robust way to construct the metric is to gross up the pre-transaction assets to fair value for 
buyouts.  
The portfolio companies of which the pre-transaction assets should be grossed up are 
identified as those that have changed organizational number from T-1 to T+0 as this legal 
structure buyout technique triggers fair value accounting from the buyout itself. To 
elaborate, a buyout fund often uses an empty holding company as an acquisition vehicle 
which later on merges with the portfolio company (Bienz et al., 2016). This process triggers 
the revaluation of the portfolio company’s asset base (see Rskl. §§ 5—14 and 5--19). 
Therefore, the asset base in the buyout year (T+0) is scaled back to T-1 for the relevant 
companies. To control for the possible bias introduced by this approach, a verification 
analysis of EBITDA/Tangible Assets (tan ROA) is conducted to ensure that the pre-
transaction base reflects appropriate fair value, where we have subtracted the intangible 
assets from the total assets. 
As a further breakdown of ROA, we will also analyze its components Return on Sales 
(ROS), measured as EBITDA/Sales to assess the change in profitability after operating 
expenses, and the changes in the Asset Turnover (Sales/Assets) to assess how effectively the 
companies are utilizing their assets to generate sales. Furthermore, we analyze developments 
in sales and EBITDA to identify differences in growth between the buyouts and the control 
group. Turnover growth is widely used in previous research as a measure of economic 
performance at company level and is of high relevance as growth above cost of capital is 
driving value creation, and an increasing amount of PE strategies focus on this area.  
We will also analyze changes in working capital in relation to sales as an additional key 
measure to capture drivers of asset productivity, similar to Holthausen & Larcker (1996). 
This ratio defines the relationship between the capital that funds and the revenue generated 
from operations, hence how efficiently capital is employed to run the business (Petersen et 
al., 2017). A standard working capital/sales ratio (WC ratio), defined as current assets - 
current liabilities divided by sales is applied. We also include a second measure of working 
capital efficiency, adjusted net working capital to sales (Adj. NWC ratio), calculated as 
Accounts receivable + Inventory - Accounts payable - Accrued liabilities - Taxes payable 
divided by sales. This measure excludes liquid and non-operational (i.e. financing) elements 
from consideration. Hence, this measurement relates to the purely operational aspects of a 
business.  
    
Conclusively, we apply EBITDA/Total Assets to measure operating profitability and 
decompose this measure into Return on Sales (ROS, measured as EBITDA/Sales) and asset 
turnover (Sales/Assets). We also apply Working Capital/Sales and adjusted Net Working 
Capital/Sales to capture underlying asset-related productivity performance improvement in 
areas that are considered key levers targeted by PE sponsors. Overall, these operating 
profitability measures focus on the ability of the PE firm to improve the operating 
performance of the portfolio company. This includes cost reductions and margin 
improvements, elimination of unproductive assets, more efficient use of remaining assets, or 
making value-enhancing acquisitions. We also apply growth in sales and EBITDA to capture 
growth related performance differences.  
4.4 Construction of the Control Group  
In this section we will highlight why we consider propensity score matching (PSM) to be the 
preferred method for constructing control groups for benchmarking and testing operating 
performance of PE backed companies. Furthermore, applying PSM, we will outline 1) how 
we construct the distance measure, 2) how we choose and implement an appropriate 
matching method and 3) how we assess the quality of the matches and analyze the outcome 
and estimation of the treatment effect. 
Propensity Score Matching: The Preferred Method  
Identifying whether PE investors causally impact the portfolio company’s operations and 
performance is challenging as PE firms do not select portfolio companies randomly. 
However, if the treatment is randomly allocated it ensures that the treatment status will not 
be confounded with either measured or unmeasured baseline characteristics (Austin, 2011).  
Hence, the treatment effect on outcomes can be directly estimated by comparing outcomes 
between the treated and untreated subjects (Greenland et al., 1999). If the decision to invest 
is randomly assigned, this can be done by simply calculating the difference between the 
average outcome for portfolio companies and non-PE-backed companies, referred to as the 
population Average Treatment Effect (ATE), formulated as 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝜏) = 𝐸[𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)]. 
The ATE parameter is the difference of the expected outcomes after treatment and no 
treatment on all individuals, thus the average effect in the population of moving an entire 
population from untreated to treated (Austin, 2011; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Stuart, 
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2010). As such, the ATE parameter is the expected effect on the outcome given that portfolio 
companies were randomly selected by PE funds.  
The ATE estimate includes, however, the effect on all companies, even those who PE funds 
would not consider acquiring. Also, the fact that buyout targets are chosen based on certain 
company-specific and market characteristics makes the selection process non-random. More 
specifically, PE firms often specialize in certain industries making some industries more 
prone to buyout activity than others, and often select firms that have improvement- and 
growth-potential, and preferably strong financial positions (Cressy et al., 2007; Harris et al., 
2005; Tykvova & Borell, 2012; Boucly et al., 2011; Gompers et al., 2016). PE activity also 
correlates with economic cycles (booms and busts), making timing a non-random factor as 
well (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Hence, a more suitable evaluation parameter of the 
treatment effect is the Average Treatment effect for the Treated (ATT), and is given by: 
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝜏|𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 1]. ATT is defined as the difference 
between expected outcome values with and without treatment for those who participated in 
treatment (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). As such, the ATT estimate compares the average 
outcome of the portfolio companies with PE-backing, against the counterfactual outcome 
where they are not backed by a PE firm, making this a much more appropriate parameter to 
apply. Hence, we will focus on the ATT, similarly to the majority of evaluation studies 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Nonetheless, the counterfactual - 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 1] - is non-
observable since the decision to invest is a dichotomous variable, thus we have to find a 
proper substitute. 
Ideally, we would compare two identical firms where one is acquired by PE (treated) and 
one is not (untreated). Since we are unable to observe both the treated outcome and the 
untreated outcome for the same portfolio company, the standard approach in the literature is 
to match PE-backed companies with control firms selected using observable characteristics. 
Such counterfactuals will generate unbiased estimates under the assumption that these 
characteristics that define the untreated are exactly the ones that led PE to invest in the 
portfolio company in the first place. Given the lengthy due diligence and high stakes 
involved, this is a quite strong assumption31. Moreover, making the matching ceteris paribus 
 
31 Gompers et al.’s (2016) survey reports that out of every hundred opportunities considered by a PE investor, fewer than 24 
are deeply analyzed, less than 14 involve signed letter of intent and only 6 are closed. 
    
is difficult due to unobservable dimensions such as future prospects, level of expertise, 
quality of management, ability to adapt and scalability. These systematic differences 
challenge any determination of causal inference from receiving PE-treatment by introducing 
selection bias that need to be accounted for (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). If not accounted 
for, any statistically significant relationship could potentially be attributable to PE firms 
repeatedly picking winners that perform well independently of receiving PE funding, and not 
as an effect of enhanced value creation from PE ownership. Hence, the potential superiority 
in operating performance could derive from superior company-selection skills rather than 
superior ownership attribution. Therefore, the construction of the control group, i.e., the 
counterfactual in the ATT estimator, needs to adjust for factors such as industry- and firm-
characteristics and market timing to estimate the effect of PE-backing alone. If the 
counterfactual works as intended, meaning that all extraneous variables are controlled for, it 
assures that the only difference between the two groups is the treatment from PE-backing 
(Olmos & Govindasamy, 2015). A way to achieve this is by applying Propensity Score 
Matching which allows us to estimate the ATT (Imbens, 2004). 
4.4.1 Implementation of Propensity Score Matching 
PSM is a statistical technique that has proven useful to evaluate treatment effects when using 
observational data32 (Austin, 2011; Rubin, 1983). Using PSM makes it possible to design a 
study that imitates some of the characteristics of a randomized study (Austin, 2011). The 
propensity score is the probability of treatment assignment (in our case being subject to a PE 
buyout) conditional on observed baseline characteristics (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Hence, we have: (𝑧 =𝑖 |X), where z = treatment, i = treatment condition, and X = covariates. 
As the likelihood of receiving treatment is non-random, the probability (𝑧 =𝑖 |X) is unknown. 
But it can be estimated from the data using a logistic regression model, where treatment 
assignment is regressed on the set of observed covariates (Olmos & Govindasamy, 2015; 
Austin, 2011). Thus, PSM involves constructing matched sets of treated and untreated 
subjects who share a similar value of the propensity score, i.e., same likelihood of receiving 
treatment (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983, 1985; Olmos & Govindasamy, 2015). More 
 
32 The method has been used in several similar studies, see e.g., Cohn et al., 2014; Ayash & Schütt, 2016; Bienz et al., 
2016; Friedrich, 2015; Bakke & Bull-Berg, 2016; Halvorsen & Johansen, 2017).  
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specifically, similar to randomization, propensity score matching aims to balance33 the 
distribution of observed covariates between treated and untreated subjects (Stuart 2010; 
Austin, 2011). The procedure involves identifying companies that have similar observable 
characteristics (covariates) to the portfolio company pre-buyout to create a control group. As 
such, the control group will serve as the counterfactual of the portfolio companies’ 
performance had it not been acquired by PE. Moreover, the companies in the data set are 
matched on the propensity score whereupon companies that share the same score are 
regarded as equal, even though they may vary on the specific values of the covariates 
(Holmes, 2014). Although PSM have some drawbacks in their approximation of randomized 
experiments, these are more apparent in smaller data samples (King & Nielsen, 2019). In 
sum, PSM is a forceful method extensively applied to balance out imbalanced data sets to 
provide adequate matches between the control and treatment groups and removes the effects 
of reciprocal interdependencies when estimating the effects of treatment on outcomes, 
allowing for the estimation of ATT (Austin, 2011). Therefore, we will apply PSM to 
construct a control group aimed at controlling for the endogeneity of the buyout decision and 
reducing selection bias.  
However, there are two main assumptions associated with causality that need to be satisfied 
for the PSM method to work (Draper & Smith, 1998). The ignorable treatment assignment 
assumption (ITAA) says that treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes 
conditional on the observed baseline covariates (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Austin, 2011). 
The other assumption is common support which states that there is a positive probability of 
being in the untreated and treated group for each value of a covariate, also described as 
overlap between the two groups (Austin, 2011). Under random assignment these 
assumptions hold, and the true propensity score is known. However, why some companies 
receive PE-funding is not random. Hence, it is important that we can identify and control 
(match on) all the reasons why some companies are in the treatment or control group. If 
important variables that are believed to be critical in the selection process are ignored, it will 
increase the bias of the estimated results. This is commonly referred to as endogeneity 
issues, which influences the ability to determine causal relationships (Olmos & 
Govindasamy, 2015). 
 
33  Stuart (2010) defines “matching” broadly to be any method that aims to equate (or “balance”) the distribution of the 
covariates in the treated and control groups. 
    
Stuart (2010) provides three key steps involved for creating the PSM sample and to satisfy 
the two assumptions mentioned above; 1) determine the distance measure, 2) choosing and 
implementing an appropriate matching method and 3) assessing the quality of the matches 
and analyzing the outcome and estimation of the treatment effect. 
Determine the Distance Measure 
To construct the distance measure, one must decide which covariates to include before 
combining those covariates into one distance measure (Stuart, 2010). A key concept here is 
to satisfy the strong ignorability assumption when determining the covariates. To do so, 
there must not be any unobserved differences between the treatment and the control groups, 
conditional on the observed covariates. Consequently, all known variables that are linked to 
both the treatment assignment (PE’s decision to invest) and the outcome (post-buyout 
performance) must be included in the matching procedure (Stuart, 2010; Rubin & Thomas, 
2000). If such variables are omitted it can increase the bias in the estimates (Heckman, 
1997). Meanwhile, Rosenbaum (1984) notes that it is important to include only variables that 
are not influenced or modified by participation or anticipation of treatment in the model 
(Austin, 2011). Measuring the variables prior to the investment (T-1) or holding them fixed 
over time would ensure this, and reduce the bias (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Barber & 
Lyon, 1996). 
The previously discussed changes PE usually implements in the buyout-year implies that in 
the buyout year, the variables have been affected by the treatment. Therefore, matching on 
the buyout year (T+0) conflicts with the strong ignorability assumption. It further implies 
that the propensity score value (in the buyout year) will be a biased estimate of the treatment 
effect at that propensity score value, thus matching on T+0 leads to biased estimates (Stuart, 
2010). On a more practical level, the P&L of holding companies that are registered during 
the year of entry often only account for profit and loss items (i.e., revenues and costs) since 
the actual date of registration and closing of the transaction, and not the entire year. 
Matching on the year of acquisition would hence bias the control group, since the P&Ls of 
the treated group are understated in the year of acquisition. This would result in an 
overstatement of the post-buyout operating performance of the treated group relative to the 
control group. By matching on the pre-buyout year and excluding the year of PE entry in our 
analysis, we ensure proper matching and avoid these pitfalls. As previously mentioned, we 
have therefore conducted extensive research to obtain and evaluate accounting data and other 
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company specific facts one year prior to the investment, in order to substantially reduce the 
bias without losing a significant amount of observations. The same approach is 
recommended and used by Kaplan (1989), Holthausen & Larcker (1996), Cao & Lerner 
(2006), Boucly et al., (2011) and Ayash & Schütt (2016), among others.  
Further, when deciding on which variables to add, it is important to take into account that 
including non-significant variables in the propensity score specification can increase their 
variance but will not bias the propensity score estimates (Bryson et al., 2002). Additionally, 
an over-parameterized model may exacerbate the support problem (Bryson et al., 2002; 
Augurzky & Schmidt, 2001). However, Rubin & Thomas (2000) argue that a variable should 
only be excluded if the variable is unrelated to the outcome or not an appropriate covariate, 
and if in doubt their advice is to include the relevant variables in the PSM estimation. As 
such, there exists arguments both for and against including all the reasonable covariates 
available. In sum, as stated by Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), these points imply that one 
should base the inclusion of the variables on economic theory and previous empirical 
findings. To use theoretical evidence as guidance is also suggested by Rubin (2001), Sianesi 
(2004), Smith & Todd (2005) and Olmos & Govindasamy (2015).  
We have applied a large survey of PE investors who were asked how they select comparable 
companies for multiple valuation and/or exit value as well as previous research to determine 
the variables for matching the treatment group and the control group. Based on the empirical 
survey by Gompers et al. (2016), PE investors choose comparable companies based on the 
following characteristics and ranked order of importance; industry, firm size, growth, margin 
and capital intensity. Moreover, increases in sales and capital intensity tend to be some of the 
largest changes of companies subject to a buyout (Biesinger et al. (2020). Thus, based on 
Gompers et al. (2016), Biesinger et al. (2020) and previously mentioned literature such as 
Ayash & Schutt (2016), we match on the following variables: industry (to control for 
different industry characteristics and performance trajectories such as different industry life 
cycles), year (to control for macro-trends and other effects influencing performance), log of 
Total Sales (as a proxy for firm size to control for firm life cycle and future growth 
opportunities34), ROS (EBITDA/Sales to account for differences in margins), and lastly 
 
34 Log of sales is a widely used proxy for firm size in empirical corporate finance. See e.g., Dang & Li’s Measuring Firm 
Size in Empirical Corporate Finance (2015). 
    
Sales/Total Assets (as a measure of asset turnover and to account for the capital intensity, 
i.e., Total Assets/Sales). These are all assumed to affect the post-buyout performance as well 
as control for pre-event performance given that we match on the year prior to buyout and 
have control for industry. We regress treatment (e.g., subject to a buyout) on the covariates 
to determine if they are associated with treatment assignment. The results are reported in the 
Appendix in Table A.I and indicate that all covariates except EBITDA-margin are related to 
the buyout decision in our sample. This regression is conducted on various variables (of 
which the results are for brevity not reported), and ROA is for instance not found significant 
in our sample. We indirectly control for differences in profitability (ROA) by matching on 
its subcomponents (asset turnover and EBITDA-margins). Noteworthy, there is a trade-off 
between the sample size and satisfying the ignorable treatment assignment assumption. 
Given that the matching procedure requires complete information on all parameters included 
in the model, any missing variable-information will lead to reduced quality of the matched 
sample. Thus, we have to consider the data observations we have available to make sure we 
only include variables that have sufficient observations. Optimally, we would match on pre-
buyout performance growth such as sales growth. However, the data lack many observations 
for T-2 and T-3 which are necessary to determine pre-growth leading up to the buyout35. 
Additionally, as the number of covariates increases, it becomes difficult to find good 
matches for companies in the treatment group. 
Furthermore, determining the covariates used for matching involved testing for imbalances 
in covariates across the buyout group and the control sample prior to matching. We 
performed an omnibus test through chi-square tests to check for variables in the selection 
model for which the buyout and the control group are different, in line with Hansen & 
Bowers (2008). The results of this test on the chosen covariates indicates that at least one of 
these variables is creating a considerable imbalance between the buyout and the control 
group. The variables that were unbalanced were included in the matching process, and we 
selected those which best reduced the imbalance in the key variables sales, ROS (EBITDA-
margin), asset turnover, ROA and EBITDA. We did not match on ROA and EBITDA as the 
chosen covariates for the matching process (sales, asset turnover and EBITDA-margin) 
together cover these variables and including them in the matching process increased the 
 
35 Using the growth from T-1 to T+0 will not provide a viable measure for growth due to the accounting distortions 
affecting the buyout year. 
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imbalance likely due to an over-parameterization of the model. Moreover, when there are 
many covariates or lots of variation, propensity scores provide the advantage of, according to 
Olmos & Govindasamy (2015), reducing the number of covariates needed to be controlled 
for, by summarizing many covariates into a single measure. 
After determining which variables to include, the next step is to define the distance, i.e., how 
the covariates are summarized into one scalar given the similarity between two individuals 
and help to determine whether an individual is a good match for another (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Stuart, 2010). Firstly, for the matching to be meaningful it is imperative that 
we match exactly on industry and year36, prior to matching on other variables. This is 
essential to satisfy the strong ignorability assumption. Hence, we apply exact matching on 
the year prior to buyout and industry, the latter by matching on the category variable Sector 
provided by the SNF database to control for industry specialization and market timing 
effects (see Table A.II in the Appendix for sector list). For all other variables we use 
propensity scores estimated by using a logit probability model, which is widely used in PSM 
(Olmos & Govindasamy, 2015). The estimated propensity score is the predicted probability 
of treatment derived from the fitted regression model. Thus, we combine both exact and 
propensity score matching, as proposed by Stuart (2010), which allows us to find the control 
company with the closest propensity from the logit estimation in the same industry and year. 
Choosing and Implementing an Appropriate Matching Method 
The next step after the distance measure has been selected, is to decide how the portfolio 
companies are matched with the control group. There are various applicable matching 
methods which involve the different weights individuals receive as well as the number of 
individuals that remain in the control group after matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
The most conventional and easiest to implement is the so-called k : 1 Nearest Neighbor (NN) 
matching, which selects the k companies from the control group that has a propensity score 
closest to the portfolio company’s score (Stuart, 2010; Rubin, 1974). NN is also described as 
the most effective method for settings where the goal is to select individuals for follow-up 
analysis, and for estimating the ATT in scenarios with many more controls than treated 
individuals (Stuart, 2010). The universe (the SNF database) from which the algorithm can 
 
36  
    
select control companies consists of all Norwegian registered companies37 (ranging from 
approximately 140 000 in 2000 to 300 000 in 2015), compared to 214 portfolio companies. 
For these reasons, we apply the NN matching method.  
Further, there are different alternatives for how the NN matching method can be 
implemented (see Figure A.IV in the Appendix). We have chosen the alternative which 
allows for replacement. This implies that a control company can be used more than once as 
«nearest neighbor» for several portfolio companies. Allowing for replacement will decrease 
the bias as it increases the average quality of matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
Meanwhile, it can reduce the number of distinct control companies used to construct the 
counterfactual outcome, thus increasing the variance of the estimator (Smith & Todd, 2005). 
Nonetheless, disallowing for replacement can lead to poor matches for several portfolio 
companies sharing similarity in covariates. As we believe good quality matches outweigh the 
disadvantages of estimator variance, we allow for replacement, but also monitor the number 
of controls to ensure that the treatment effect is not estimated based on a small number of 
controls (see Table A.III in the Appendix). 
Lastly, we determine how many neighbors to include in the matching sample for each 
respective portfolio company. Again, this involves a trade-off between bias and variance. 
The variance might decrease with increasing amounts of control companies (neighbors) 
used, while the bias might increase due to poorer matches being included. Using fewer 
control companies will thus likely reduce the bias due to better matches (Smith, 1997). 
However, in large samples Smith (1997) and Rubin & Thomas (2000) argue that one should 
prefer to include more matches for each treated observation. Thus, given that the control 
group is substantially larger than the treatment group, including more companies from the 
control group matched to every portfolio company likely implies better estimates for the 
counterfactual in the control group (Olmos & Govindasamy, 2015). Usually, the number of 
controls to each treated observation is between 1 and 5 (Randolph et al., 2014). Matching on 
only the closest company conditioned on the propensity score, i.e. 1 : 1, leads to poorer 
balancing of covariates than 5 : 1 in our sample (see Table A.IV in the Appendix). In 
previous literature, 5 : 1 is commonly used as it is a good approach to the trade-off between 
 
37 The 214 PE portfolio companies are excluded from the universe of possible control companies to prevent that PE 
portfolio companies are selected as their own controls. 
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variance and bias, and we follow that construction as well. Each neighbor is equally 
weighted.  
Notably, there might be a risk of bad matches if the closest neighbor is far away from the 
portfolio company in terms of propensity score. If so, we would conflict with the common 
support assumption. Hence, to control for potential poor matches we test with a caliper of 0.1 
and 0.2 in combination with NN to restrict the control group by imposing a maximum 
tolerance level for the propensity score distance. However, while the caliper of 0.1 (0.2) 
reduces the treated sample by 9 (5) companies, the effects on bias and variance are negligible 
(see Table A.V in the Appendix). This is due to the vast sample size of untreated 
observations and that we allow for replacement. We therefore apply NN matching without a 
caliper to include all portfolio companies in the sample. 
Assessing the Quality of the Matches 
After choosing the matching method we assess the quality of the model by checking if the 
matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the included variables in both the 
matched control companies and portfolio companies. The assessment is conducted by 
comparing the situation pre- and post-matching and checking for any remaining statistical 
differences after conditioning on the propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Austin, 
2011). The quality of the matching is provided in Table IV. 
To compare the similarity of treated and untreated subjects in the matched sample we 
calculate the standardized differences in means between the groups (Austin, 2011; Ho et al., 
2007). The standardized mean difference is calculated by dividing the difference in means 
between the treated and untreated covariates by the standard deviation in the treated group 
(square root of the average sample variance of the covariates in both groups). Although no 
universally determined criterion threshold exists, Normand et al. (2001) states that a standard 
difference less than 0.1 indicates that the difference in mean between the groups is 
negligible, which is the case for all matched covariates in our sample. Table IV also 
illustrates a substantial reduction of (initially large) differences in means stipulated as 
percent balance improvement. Furthermore, the variance ratios are analyzed. The variance 
ratios should be within 0.5 and 2, and preferably close to 1 (Rubin, 2001). Even though the 
variance ratio of the EBITDA-margin has improved substantially as a result of the matching, 
it is slightly outside the preferred range.  
    
As suggested by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985) we also conduct a two-sample t-test to see if 
there are any significant differences in covariate means within the propensity score matched 
sample. Post-matching there should be balance in both groups, implying that no significant 
differences in the means of the propensity score matched groups should be found. The t-tests 
indicate that the groups are balanced. However, relying on statistical significance testing to 
detect imbalances in covariate means between treated and untreated subjects may produce 
misleading results since significance levels can be confounded with the reduced sample size 
of the matched sample compared to the original sample (Austin, 2011; Imai et al., 2008). 
Thus, the standardized differences in means and variance ratios are emphasized. 
Additionally, we assess the distribution of the propensity scores between the matched treated 
and control units to ensure that the individuals are within the area of common support based 
on overlap in the distribution of both groups (see Figure A.V in the Appendix). 
Overall, the chosen propensity score matching is implemented through the three steps to 
satisfy the main assumptions in the PSM. Resultantly, NN 5:1 matching with replacement 
results in a substantial reduction of imbalances in the covariates between the buyout group 
and the control group. The imbalances between the buyout group and the control group were 
significant prior to matching, which reflects PE’s tendency to carefully select buyout targets. 
Achieving full balance within two groups with such systematic different characteristics is 
practically not possible to achieve. However, although the ratio of variances between the two 
groups with respect to the EBITDA-margin is not as similar as we would prefer, matching 
quality appears to be high. The significantly more balanced data set makes parametric 
methods a much more reliable tool for empirical analysis and provides more confidence in 
the corresponding conclusions of PE’s operating performance relative to a carefully 
constructed control group. However, even though the bias between the two groups is 
substantially reduced by PSM, some bias might still exist. More specifically, since it is likely 
to exist unobservables affecting both the treatment decision and the outcome, the model 
might not explain all differences between the two groups. Thus, we still have to be careful in 
interpreting the results casually as there are likely other effects in play that are not fully 




Table IV – Bias Reduction in Covariates 
This table provides an assessment of the reduction in covariates means at the year prior to buyout between the 
buyout and control group, as well as the total number of observations and controls. Unmatched shows the 
balance for all the data without matching and provides the means of the buyout companies and the control 
companies and the standardized mean difference between the two groups and variance ratio. Matched shows 
the same after five-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement. We see vast improvements in reduced 
bias and variance ratio, and the percent balance improvement shows the percentage improvement by using the 
matched data relative to all data. A higher P-value indicates better matching quality.    
5 : 1 Nearest Neighbor Matching              












                
Year 
Unmatched 2008.3925 2009.3131 -0.2452   0.3865 0 
Matched 2008.3925 2008.3925 0 100.00% 1.00037 1 
                
Industry 
Unmatched 6.6121 7.5135 -0.3207   1.6422 0 
Matched 6.6121 6.6121 0 100.00% 1.00037 1 
                
Log Sales 
Unmatched 12.749 7.7104 4.182   0.312 0 
Matched 12.749 12.753 -0.0031 99.90% 0.9617 0.967 
                
EBITDA/Sales 
Unmatched 0.1283 -0.7718 5.827   0 0 
Matched 0.1283 0.1161 0.0791 98.60% 0.4549 0.355 
                
Sales/Assets 
Unmatched 1.5618 2.3611 -0.9797   0.001 0 
Matched 1.5618 1.5822 -0.025 97.50% 0.5951 0.7521 
                
Number of 
observations 
Unmatched 214 3192017         






    
4.5 Empirical Setup 
In this section we provide the methods for measuring the overall operating performance, 
specialization effects and the performance of different deal types. 
4.5.1 Operating Performance 
We analyze performance by calculating the difference-in-difference for the previously 
discussed key operating performance metrics for PE backed companies relative to the control 
group. More specifically, the change in each metric from T-1 (the pre-buyout year) to each 
respective year up to 5 years post-buyout is computed for the PE portfolio companies and for 
the control group. This is also conducted from T-1 to the last full year prior to exit for each 
portfolio company (and its corresponding matched control group) or to the last available 
accounting year if the company is still private. Below is an example of how the Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) estimator is calculated, where i assigns the year after the buyout, and 0 
is the value in the year pre-buyout: 
  (3) 
Hence, changes in PE portfolio companies’ operating performance are measured relative to 
changes in each portfolio company’s propensity score matched control group with similar 
characteristics (i.e. exact same industry and year, and similar pre-buyout performance). This 
allows us to estimate the effect of PE buyout on the portfolio companies (the ATT). 
Moreover, as the PSM methodology is designed to minimize the differences between the 
treatment group and control group in order to mimic a randomized assignment to treatment, 
we will test the differences in median and mean performance between the portfolio 
companies and the control companies in the matched sample in the years following the 
buyout. Consistent with prior literature, we provide initial evidence of the PE operating 
performance by testing differences in median performance using Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 
To formalize our tests, we subsequently perform a set of different regressions to add 
robustness to the results. Prior to running these regressions, the data is winsorized on the 
98th and 2nd percentile to control for the effect of outliers in the data distorting the means38 
 
38 The observations below the 2nd and above the 98th percentile of the distribution are set to the values at the 2nd and 98th 
percentiles. 
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The means, however, are severely affected by extreme observations, particularly among the 
controls. A closer examination of these outliers indicates that the extreme values result from 
errors/typos in the accounting database. The outliers should therefore not convey any 
important information and are therefore winsorized. Since the medians do not impose the 
same issues as with the means, the initial analysis (prior to winsorizing) is conducted on 
medians in line with most of the previous literature and research (see e.g. Ayash & Schütt, 
2016; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Guo et al., 2011 and Boucly et al., 2011)39. 
We first analyze median percentage changes in all metrics for every year post-buyout. The 
percentage changes are measured relative to the level of the corresponding ratio in T-1, 
calculated as (same for the other variables as well): 
(4) 
The reason why we use absolute value in the denominator is because some metrics are 
negative in T-1. Furthermore, the buyout-year (T+0) is omitted as it conveys little meaning 
to interpret due to the mentioned distortions to the accounting figures and we aim to only 
include full-year effects of PE ownership. Similarly, the exit year and corresponding 
accounting figures are retrieved from the year prior to exit due to several companies lacking 
full-year accounting data in the year they are acquired by a new entity.  
Previous research on PE in Norway and the Nordics usually comprises the period from entry 
year (T+0) to T+3. One possible reason for this is that since exits cannot necessarily be 
considered exogenous, the assumption might be that 3 years will capture the PE-effect as the 
majority of all buyouts comprise a holding period of at least 3 years. Hence, they attempt to 
mitigate time- or exit-dependent factors which create biased results of underlying 
performance comparisons, given that good investments are on average exited early while bad 
investments are often exited later (Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009). However, in addition to 
the three years post-buyout, we track performance changes post-buyout to T+5. This is due 
to the possibility of a “hockey-stick”-development in operating performance metrics under 
PE-ownership stemming from a lag-effect of implemented measures, especially on top-line. 
As discussed, the average holding period has gradually increased over time together with an 
 
39 We have also performed unreported t-tests on winsorized means which provided roughly the same results as the medians. 
However, we focus on medians similar to previous research. 
    
increased amount of growth capital and higher frequency of buy-and-builds. SVCAs (2017) 
reported findings in Sweden of significant improvements from T+5 and onwards supports 
this view. Hence, analyzing only the three years subsequent to a buyout might not capture 
the true or complete value creation imposed by PE ownership. Consequently, the analysed 
period is extended to include not only the T+3-effect, but until T+5 as well. We argue that 
the years after T+3 are necessary to include in order to test whether PE-backed companies 
outperform its matched peer group. 
As mentioned, one endogeneity problem with exits is that there might be a bias stemming 
from the most successful companies leaving the sample early (and prior to T+4 or T+5). GPs 
have strong incentives to exit particularly successful investments early due to the structure of 
the incentives, i.e., as carried interests are tied to measures such as IRR that favor early 
realizations of high performing investments. This can potentially downward bias the results 
since the organizational number identificatory in our database can change post-exit with new 
owners, and as such no longer be included. Meanwhile, if companies are exited early due to 
bankruptcy or restructuring, this will create an upward bias. If these biases are present, 
returns from T-1 to the last post-buyout fiscal year available prior to the exit, or the last 
available fiscal year for deals still private, may be most informative (Guo et al., 2008)40. We 
therefore analyze performance changes from T-1 to the last post-buyout fiscal year available 
prior to the exit, or the last available fiscal year for deals still private. We argue that this 
measure might yield the most relevant and informative picture of PE’s operating 
performance. The performance of the investment over a certain period of time is not 
particularly relevant compared to the end result as this is what determines the investment 
outcome. Thus, in our opinion PE should be evaluated on their ability to create value over 
the entire ownership period. Consequently, the regression analyses are based on changes in 
operating performance from T-1 to exit.  
4.5.2 Specialization Effect 
In order to test the second hypothesis of whether there is a positive relationship between PE 
companies’ degree of specialization by industry and performance, we construct a 
specialization dummy. This dummy is based on a constructed measure that captures the 
 
40 We have, however, controlled for the latter potential bias, as only 4 companies are bankrupt within 5 years post-buyout. 
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different PE firm’s degree of specialization by industry, similar to (Cressy et al., 2007). This 
measure, called “the Index of Competitive Advantage” or “ICA index” is adapted from the 
literature on international trade and technological specialization (Archibugi & Pianta, 1994). 
We follow the method applied by Cressy et al. (2007) to compute the ICA index for each PE 
company over the same period by using each PE company’s distribution of historical 
investments sorted on sector.  
   (  )  (   )      (5) 
where the dot indicates summation over the relevant subscript and  
 is the number of portfolio companies of PE firm i in industry/stage j  
 is the total number of companies invested in industry/stage j by all PE firms 
 is the total number of portfolio companies of PE firm i  
 is the total number of companies invested by all PE firms (i.e. across all industries/stages) 
The numerator in this measure (   ) represents PE firm i’s share of all investments in 
industry/stage j and the denominator ( ) represents its share in all investments across all 
industries.  
 
The different PE companies’ distributions of historical investments sorted on sector are 
retrieved from Capital IQ, in line with the sector of each transaction. Since our sample 
consists of 49 different PE companies of which many are foreign and have not conducted 
more than a few transactions in Norway, using their distribution of transactions conducted in 
Norway as a basis for determining their degree of relative specialization would not make 
sense. We therefore use each PE company’s distribution of investments by sector in Europe 
as a basis for the calculation. However, the distinct characteristics of the Norwegian PE 
market, which is relatively skewed towards Energy, introduces a challenge. As the index is 
constructed to measure relative specialization among PE companies, transactions within less 
common sectors (such as Energy) relative to the entire population of transactions conducted 
by the respective PE companies (such as Consumer) are assigned more weight. Hence, PE 
companies with only a few investments within Energy are deemed specialized by the ICA 
index. We therefore apply a filter that requires a PE company to have conducted more than 
five transactions within any sector to be deemed specialized.   
    
This index is used to generate an “Industry-Specialized” dummy that takes the value 1 for 
companies that are acquired by a PE company specialized in the respective company’s 
sector, (i.e., the ICA index>1 for the PE company). Applying this measure yields 140 
specialized transactions out of 214. We first analyze how specialized PE investors perform 
relative to their constructed control group by examining changes in medians from T-1 to T+5 
and exit. Similarly, we run a regression on the performance of specialized PE transactions 
relative to its controls from entry to exit to add robustness to our results. In a second 
regression, we analyze how specialized transactions perform relative to non-specialized PE 
transactions (generalists), to see if we are able to find any outperformance between the two 
groups relative to their respective control groups.   
4.5.3 Deal Type 
To test whether the deal types differ in performance, we include the following dummy 
variables: “Public-to-private”, “Private-to-private”, “Secondary”, “Divisional Buyout” and 
“PIPE”. Each buyout is assigned to one of these categories, based on collected transaction 
information from Factset, Valu8, Capital IQ, press releases and PE companies web pages. 
We run two regressions in a similar manner as the regressions testing for specialization 
effects. Hence, we run one regression where each deal type (except PIPE) is tested against its 
respective benchmark, and a second regression where the performance of each deal type 
relative to its respective benchmark is tested against the performance of private-to-private 
buyouts relative to its benchmark.  
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5. Empirical Results 
In this section we present our findings and examine the (relative) impact of PE ownership on 
operating performance based on the described operating performance measures. In 
subsections 5.2 and 5.3 we test the hypothesis of advantages to specialization and whether 
performance varies by deal type.  
5.1 Operating Performance 
We first test the main hypothesis: Does Private Equity have a positive (relative) impact on 
operating performance? As mentioned, we have performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests on 
median performance changes and regressions on means. Table V below presents test results 
on median percentage changes in the first five years after the buyout (T+1, T+2, T+3, T+4, 
T+5) and the year prior to exit or the last available fiscal year if still private (Exit), all 
compared to the last year prior to buyout (T-1). 
Examining the median levels in Table V of the operating metrics at the year prior to buyout 
(T-1), we note that these are quite balanced between the portfolio companies and the control 
group as a result of the propensity score matching procedure. However, while the return on 
sales is initially three percentage points higher for the portfolio companies than for the 
control group, the asset turnover is approximately twenty percentage points lower for the 
buyout group than the control group. Conversely, the median ROA is the same in both 
groups. The initial differences in tan ROA and working capital ratios are quite similar as 
well. In sum, we argue that these differences are acceptable as obtaining exact similar ratios 
across all metrics between the two groups is unattainable.  
The effect of PE ownership is estimated by testing the differences in the percentage changes of the metrics between the portfolio companies and the control group from one year prior to the buyout (T-1) to T+5, and from T-1 to the last full 
year prior to exit to capture the full holding period development. T-1 is the starting point of which the relative changes in the medians reflect (see equation (4)). Hence, -12% in T+4 for ROS is interpreted as a 12% lower median ROS than in 
T-1 (11%), corresponding to a median ROS of 9.6% for the buyout group in T+4. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test for significance of the median changes in relative performance over time (the DiD estimate). The tests are two-
tailed. Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table V – Post-Buyout Performance of All Buyouts 
Panel A: Median Differences                                 
    Values at T - 1   Difference Relative to T - 1 
    
T - 1 
  
T + 1 
  
T + 2 
  
T + 3           
    Buyouts Controls   Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
    Level Level   % Change % Change   % Change % Change   % Change % Change 
                                      
  Sales - -   25% 10% 15% 0.00***   41% 11% 30% 0.00***   43% 13% 31% 0.00*** 
                                      
  EBITDA - -   21% 8% 13% 0.04**   34% 1% 32% 0.01**   41% -3% 44% 0.02** 
                                      
  ROS 0.109 0.083   -10% 0% -10% 0.71   -10% -6% -4% 0.77   -11% -17% 6% 0.95 
                                      
  Asset turnover 1.238 1.434   9% 1% 7% 0.07*   8% -3% 10% 0.04**   4% -2% 6% 0.16 
                                      
  ROA 0.111 0.112   -4% 0% -4% 0.89   -9% -19% 10% 0.30   -10% -12% 2% 0.76 
                                      
  tan ROA 0.158 0.126   6% -1% 7% 0.09*   4% -20% 23% 0.02**   2% -9% 10% 0.15 
                                      
  WC ratio 0.075 0.079   -25% -4% -21% 0.02**   -38% -10% -28% 0.05*   -33% 5% -38% 0.01** 
                                      
  Adj. NWC ratio -0.001 -0.024   -8% -12% 4% 0.63   -13% -2% -10% 0.63   -21% 7% -28% 0.15 
                                      
  Number of Obs. 214 1051                               
          Difference Relative to T - 1 
          
T + 4 
  
T + 5 
  
Exit                
          Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
          % Change % Change   % Change % Change   % Change % Change 
                                      
  Sales - -   52% 22% 30% 0.00***   57% 30% 27% 0.00***   50% 20% 31% 0.00*** 
                                      
  EBITDA - -   46% 12% 34% 0.02**   44% 23% 21% 0.15   51% 18% 33% 0.07* 
                                      
  ROS - -   -12% -10% -2% 0.95   -15% -12% -3% 0.93   -5% -14% 9% 0.39 
                                      
  Asset turnover - -   5% -2% 7% 0.20   6% -1% 7% 0.35   4% 0% 4% 0.05** 
                                      
  ROA - -   -1% -9% 8% 0.50   -10% -18% 8% 0.58   0% -16% 15% 0.27 
                                      
  tan ROA - -   9% -11% 19% 0.04**   5% -19% 24% 0.08*   12% -18% 30% 0.03** 
                                      
  WC ratio - -   -39% 18% -57% 0.00***   -40% 51% -90% 0.00***   -38% 13% -51% 0.00*** 
                                      
  Adj. NWC ratio - -   -24% 0% -24% 0.15   -40% -4% -36% 0.02**   -23% -9% -14% 0.53 
                                      
5.1.1 Development in Return on Assets 
The development in median ROA is favorable relative to the control group for all years after 
T+1. However, the results are not statistically significant. On an absolute basis, ROA is 
unchanged by exit year, but decreases every year compared to T-1 until exit year. Over the 
same period, the controls experience a negative development in ROA of 16%.  
These results contrast some of the previous research on PE in the Nordics41 which find 
tendencies of negative relative ROA-performance in portfolio companies compared to their 
respective benchmarks although the overall results lack statistical significance. On the 
contrary, Friedrich (2015) finds a positive development in ROA in all years (up to T+3) for 
portfolio companies in Norway relative to benchmarks. From year T+0 to T+1 the 
differential effect is 44.30% at a 5%-level of significance, and 23.60% from T+0 to T+3 
although the latter is not statistically significant.  
The mentioned research measures ROA as EBITDA to total assets but matches the control 
companies to the portfolio companies in the same year as the buyout occurs as a reference 
point for the analysis. As discussed, this imposes a risk of upward bias in performance in the 
final results as the P&L statement of portfolio companies is often understated in the buyout 
year. Hence, all else equal, we would expect to find less positive ROA developments than 
these papers. In summary, the medians provide no statistically significant evidence of PE 
outperformance with respect to ROA. We can however observe tendencies of positive 
developments relative to the benchmark and flat absolute development upon exit.  
Additionally, we have analyzed the developments of EBITDA to tangible assets (tan ROA). 
Thus, by removing the intangible assets which include the goodwill (acquisition premium 
paid), we attempt to control for the effect of amortization and impairments of goodwill on 
the asset base and hence ROA (EBITDA/total assets), and the potential bias of scaling the 
assets in T+0 to the pre-transaction asset base. This measure is immune to the changes 
in impairments and amortization of goodwill often triggered by buyouts, and hence avoids 
this potential bias. However, by taking intangible assets out of the denominator but not 
adjusting for the possible benefits from intangibles in the numerator, this adjustment biases 
the measure positively in relation to finding operating improvements. Especially in cases of 
 
41 See Halvorsen & Johansen, 2017 and Bakke & Bull-Berg, 2016. 
    
buy-and-build strategies or roll-ups, the portfolio companies will benefit from an increased 
EBITDA in the numerator. As such, we would expect to find an outperformance in the tan 
ROA measure, which also turns out to be the case. In every year post-buyout, the median 
change in tan ROA exceeds the control group at statistically significant levels. From T-1 to 
exit, the median change in tan ROA for the buyouts is 30% higher than the median change 
for the controls. These findings sharply contrast the research of Ayash & Schütt (2016) who 
find evidence of increased ROA, but when applying this adjusted measure 
(EBITDA/tangible assets) find no evidence of operating improvements on US LBOs. 
A further inspection of the subcomponents of ROA, namely return on sales (or ROS 
calculated as EBITDA/Sales) and the asset turnover (Sales/Assets) is conducted to 
understand why PE backed companies apparently do not outperform the control group with 
respect to ROA. 
5.1.2 Development in Return on Sales 
Examining return on sales (ROS, measured as EBITDA/sales) we find no evidence of 
improvements. Relative to the benchmark there are marginal improvements in year 3 and the 
exit year, but these are not statistically significant. For the rest of the years (and for all years 
on a stand-alone basis) the changes in ROS are negative, but not statistically significant. 
Thus, our findings might indicate that PE focuses on enhancing the top-line (as will be 
elaborated below), but with no change in margins. These findings contradict the belief that 
PE commonly initiates cost reduction programs after a buyout which leads to improved 
margins and enhancement in asset productivity (Muscarella & Vetsuypens 1990; Harris et 
al., 2005). Moreover, the findings are not in line with older research suggesting that margin 
improvement   is an essential value creation lever in portfolio companies (Gulliksen et al., 
2008). On the other hand, our findings are consistent with the outlined structural changes in 
section 3.2. More specifically, the PE industry’s traditional value levers like cost cutting and 
aligning management incentives have become more commoditized post-2000 where “low 
hanging fruit” initiatives have already been implemented by previous owners. 
5.1.3 Development in Asset Turnover  
The median changes in asset turnover are positive for all years and the difference between 
buyouts and the control group is found statistically significant in T+1, T+2 and the exit year. 
These results indicate that PE is able to increase sales in relation to assets over the holding 
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period and outperforms the control group by approximately 4%. This corresponds to 
research by Friedrich (2015) who finds a significant higher increase in asset turnover for 
buyouts than for the peer companies in Norway. Considering the increase in subsequent 
M&A activity conducted by the buyouts, the improvement in the asset turnover indicates that 
the PE-backed companies are able to grow sales at a higher pace than the growth in assets 
stemming from potential add-ons. As elaborated below, the improved asset turnover is 
supported by a statistically significant positive improvement in sales over the five years 
subsequent to the buyout year.  
5.1.4 Development in Sales 
We see that the portfolio companies quickly grow their top line relative to the year prior to 
the buyout, resulting in a 15% outperformance in T+1, and 30% in T+2. The revenue growth 
is positive for all years, and from T-1 to the year prior to exit (or the last available year for 
portfolio companies still private), the median PE portfolio company has increased sales by 
50% and outperformed the benchmark by 31%. Overall, compared to the benchmark, PE 
demonstrates an outperformance of 15%, 30%, 31%, 30% and 27%, in the 5 years following 
the buyout-year, respectively. Between entry to exit we find a median (mean) sales CAGR of 
approximately 8.8% (10.8%) for the portfolio companies and 3.9% (1.9%) for the controls. 
All DiD estimates are found statistically significant at 1%-level. Moreover, the results 
indicate that the improvement stems from the growth in the first 3 years post buyout, as we 
see that sales grow rapidly in the first years, before it flattens at around 50% in T+4.  
Our findings are in line with previous findings in the Nordics (Grubb & Johansen, 2007; 
Gulliksen et al., 2008; Friedrich, 2015; Bakke & Bull-Berg, 2016; Halvorsen & Johansen, 
2017), who all find statistically significant growth in sales for portfolio companies relative to 
their matched peer groups in all three years post-buyout. Increase in sales can be achieved 
either organically by improving the pricing, volume (marketing and sales strategies) and 
product mix or services, or inorganically by making add-on acquisitions. Particularly 
relevant is Friedrich (2015) findings on Norwegian portfolio companies, where he finds a 
median sales increase of 62.31% and an outperformance of 64.7% at year two post-buyout. 
Surprisingly, the sales decreased by 2.34% in his control group over the same period, raising 
the question of the quality of his control group and the estimated outperformance. In 
addition, the stand-alone sales increase is likely upward biased as a consequence of Friedrich 
(2015) using the buyout year (generally implying an understated revenue) as the reference 
    
point. NVCA (2020) also finds that the growth in sales flattens and stabilizes around the 
third year post-buyout, where NVCA (2020) suggests that the portfolio company is maturing 
and much of the short-term growth potential is utilized during the first years of the holding 
period.  
In summary, our research documents clear PE outperformance on sales growth. In addition, 
it documents high growth in the first three years post-buyout before growth flattens. These 
findings are consistent with other research on Norwegian PE, despite some biases in the 
latter methodologies.      
5.1.5 Development in EBITDA 
We find that EBITDA follows the same development pattern as sales. From entry to the year 
prior to exit (or the last available fiscal year if not exited), the median EBITDA increases by 
51% and outperforms the benchmark by 33%. The EBITDA growth from the buyout year to 
each respective year is significantly higher than the control group for each year at a 5%-
level, except in year 5 (10%-level of confidence). The EBITDA growth appears to peak in 
T+4, as the EBITDA actually declines from T+4 to T+5. This might indicate that either the 
(short-term) growth potential is realized after four years, or that the most favorable 
investments are realized within 4 years, similar to what is suggested by NVCA (2020).  
5.1.6 Development of Working Capital 
The WC ratio (calculated as current assets minus current liabilities divided by sales) 
provides evidence of a favorable and strong development in working capital management for 
buyouts, in line with Lee and Lou´s (2017) findings. Working capital relative to sales 
declines in each subsequent year compared to the level in T-1, both on a stand-alone basis 
and relative to the controls. For the first three post-buyout years, the changes in the WC ratio 
are statistically significantly different from the controls at 5%-level (T+1 and T+3) and 10%-
level (T+2). For the latter years (T+4 and T+5), and all the way to exit, the differences are 
significant at the 1%-level. During the holding period, the WC ratio has declined by 38%, 
while the controls have increased the WC ratio by 13%. Controlling for the fact that the 
reductions in the WC ratio might be attributable to PE holding less cash in their portfolio 
companies than their peers, and thereby increased liquidity risk, generate results pointing in 
the same direction, (although only statistically significant in T+5). The adjusted net working 
capital ratio (Adj. NWC ratio) which excludes liquid and non-operational (i.e. financing) 
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elements from consideration might be better suited to capture operational improvements as it 
relates to the purely operational aspects of a business. The adj. NWC steadily decreases 
during the holding period until T+5, both in absolute figures and relative to the control 
group. Until exit, the adjusted net working capital relative to sales is reduced by 23% and 
14% relative to the control group although only statistically significant in year 5. The 
gradual reduction in adjusted net working capital relative to sales each year from T-1 to T+5 
indicates that working capital management on an operational level (apart from “quick fixes” 
such as reducing cash), takes time which is consistent with that changes in invoicing, 
inventory and supplier procedures and terms typically takes years to implement. 
Overall, the results indicate that working capital management is a continuous focus for PE. 
Thus, PE appears superior in freeing up cash to support growth, finance investments, reduce 
leverage or distribute dividends.  
5.1.7 Regression Analysis  
To formalize our statistical tests, we run the following regression analysis on all buyouts and 
controls from entry to exit: 
           (6) 
where Y is the dependent variable. This regression is conducted on all performance 
measures42 and is depicted in Table VI. An explanation of the variables included in the 
regressions is provided in Appendix Table A.VI along with specifications for all regression 
models used. Given that the initial levels often serve as predictors for future growth, we 
control for the initial level of the dependent variable of interest, in line with previous 
research (see e.g., Cressy et al., 2007). The initial value of the dependent variable is also 
likely to capture effects of other variables that are assumed to have an effect on both the 
dependent variable and the treatment decision (i.e., being acquired by PE). Controlling for 
the initial value is also particularly important since the regression depicts changes in ratios, 
and not percentage changes relative to the initial level as depicted for medians in Table V. 
Hence, by controlling for the initial level we account for the fact that it might be more 
challenging to improve an initially high ROA than an initially low ROA. The highly 
 
42 Note that for CAGR sales the dependent variable is not delta (change) but the Continuous Annual Growth Rate for the 
relevant period as is. 
    
significant and negative coefficients for the initial levels of ROA, asset turnover, ROS and 
tan ROA supports this view. We also control for the holding period. Note that the “holding 
period” of each control company corresponds to the holding period of its matched PE 
company. In other words, if a PE company is included in the sample from for instance 2010-
2015, its control group is included in the sample in the same period (i.e., it enters the sample 
in 2010 and leaves the sample after 2015). All observations without complete financial 
statements from entry to exit are excluded. Thus, if a PE company is excluded from the 
sample for this reason, so are its controls. We run two regressions; one including year and 
sector fixed effects as additional controls, and one without (see Table A.VII in the 
Appendix). The results do not differ among the two regressions, confirming that our 
matching approach has successfully accounted for year and sector effects. 
The regression confirms most of the findings on medians from Table V. More specifically, 
PE portfolio companies clearly outperform the benchmark with respect to sales growth. In 
our model, the effect of private equity on CAGR sales is 7 percentage points. In other words, 
if we were to interpret these results casually, being acquired by PE leads to an increase of 7 
percentage points in CAGR sales relative to the counterfactual outcome where the company 
was not acquired by PE. Furthermore, the effect of PE on EBITDA is a 51% increase relative 
to non-PE companies over the holding period. Similar to the analysis of medians, the 
regression analysis provides no evidence of improvements in return on assets (ROA) nor 
return on sales (ROS) relative to the control group. However, in contrast to medians, the 
regression does not provide statistical evidence in favor of PE outperformance with respect 
to asset turnover. Even though the coefficient is pointing in the same direction where PE is 
associated with a three-percentage point increase in asset turnover relative to the controls, 
this effect is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, the PE outperformance with respect to 
return on intangible assets (tan ROA) and working capital relative to sales is confirmed. 
Companies acquired by PE increase their return on tangible assets with five percentage 
points relative to the controls and reduce the working capital over sales by 11 percentage 
points relative to the controls.  
Table VI – Regression Analysis for All Buyouts  
Panel A: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                         
                                
Independent                                
Variables Dependent Variables 
  CAGR sales   Delta EBITDA %   Delta ROS   Delta asset turnover   Delta ROA   Delta tan ROA   Delta WC   Delta adj. NWC 
                                
PE dummy 0.07***   0.51***   0.01   0.03   0.01   0.05**   -0.11***   -0.01 
  (0.0102)   (0.2468)   (0.0107)   (0.0500)   (0.0115)   (0.0203)   (0.0217)   (0.0149) 
                                
Holding period 0.00*   0.02   -0.00   0.00   0.00**   -0.01***   0.00   0.00 
  (0.0020)   (0.0421)   (0.0022)   (0.0104)   (0.0019)   (0.0030)   (0.0058)   (0.0031) 
                                
Initial sales -3.44E-09                             
  (3.03E-9)                             
Initial EBITDA     0.00**                         
      (158.00E-9)                         
Initial ROS         -0.20***                     
          (0.0358)                     
Initial asset turnover             -0.21***                 
              (0.0285)                 
Initial ROA                 -0.45***             
                  (0.0053)             
Initial tan ROA                     -0.45***         
                      (0.1111)         
Initial WC/sales                         0.03     
                          (0.0183)     
Initial adj. NWC/sales                           -0.01*** 
                              (0.0035) 
                                
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                
Sector Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                
Constant 0.07   0.75   0.09   0.01   0.04   0.07   0.03   0.00 
  (0.0502)   (1.0882)   (0.0604)   (0.1851)   (0.0526)   (0.0896)   (0.0984)   (0.0915) 
N 858   858   858   858   858   858   858   858 
R-squared 0.11   0.06   0.16   0.13   0.32   0.28   0.04   0.05 
Robust SE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
This table depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts from entry (T-1) to exit (exit year-1) compared to the matched control group. This means that N (858) includes both PE-backed companies and the control 
companies. The regressions are OLS regressions. In total the table shows eight separate regressions ran on eight different dependent variables. Besides controlling for the initial value of the relevant dependent variable, all 
regressions have the same controls. A description of all variables included in the model is given in Table A.VI in the Appendix. The significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, respectively.
To summarize, PE appears to significantly improve sales growth which translates into a 
median 33% (mean 51%) improvement in EBITDA from entry to exit. We do, however, not 
find improvements in operating profitability measured by ROA. Decomposing ROA, we find 
evidence indicating that the operating profitability among the portfolio companies appears to 
be driven by improvements in asset turnover, counteracted by stable margins. The asset 
turnover improvements are, however, only statistically significant for medians. We also find 
improvements in working capital although the evidence is less clear when excluding cash 
and interest-bearing short-term liabilities.  
Given that ROA is more or less unchanged during the period until exit, it indicates that the 
growth in assets corresponds to the growth in EBITDA. Also, while sales and EBITDA grow 
significantly, ROS remains relatively unchanged. Again, this implies that revenue growth 
appears to be the main focus and driver behind value creation in portfolio companies, rather 
than cutting costs and focusing on margins. This conclusion corresponds to other research 
focused on Norway (see Friedrich, 2015), but not in Sweden where Grubb & Jonsson (2007) 
find significant improvement in margins as well.  
The clear outperformance in tan ROA and no clear outperformance in ROA indicates that PE 
in Norway substantially increases the intangible asset base by performing add-on 
acquisitions. This increased asset base translates into neutral ROA developments as PE is 
apparently not able to capitalize on the increased asset base resulting from acquisitions. One 
explanation might be that growth is the primary objective, without necessarily targeting 
improvements in margins or return on assets. In addition, the growth investments may 
require indirect costs resulting from resources, infrastructure, and systems to enable top line 
growth (Cambridge Associates, 2019). This may result in decreasing margins and ROA in 
the years post-buyout. Thereafter, cost-cutting and operational efficiencies captured from a 
larger revenue platform may explain the unchanged ROA from T-1-levels to the last year 
prior to the actual exit. Thus, it seems like PE has focused on creating a revenue-engine and 
a scalable platform with potential from further growth post-exit. The need to demonstrate 
strong growth in the portfolio company can also be explained by the increasing entry 
valuations, particularly at the growth stage where increases have been most pronounced 
(Cambridge Associates, 2019). 
The value creating rationale in terms of investment returns might be that operational returns 
from marginal acquisitions or organic growth investments exceed the cost of capital. In other 
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words, if marginal ROA from an investment exceeds cost of capital, the investment should 
be made. The ROA levels and developments indicate that this is likely the case in our 
sample43. In addition, value creating growth is likely to impact exit multiples positively, 
creating a multiple expansion from entry to exit for the PE firm. The general increase in 
multiples over the last decades also imply that these growth investments have benefited from 
this in terms of investment returns.  
5.2 The Effect of PE Specialization  
We furthermore explore if there is a relationship between PE companies’ degree of 
specialization by industry and performance post-buyout, to test the hypothesis of any 
additional positive effects stemming from specialization. Following the same approach as 
with all portfolio companies, Table VII presents median changes in the performance of 
specialized PE buyouts relative to the control group of these specialized buyouts from T-1 to 
T+5 and Exit.  
From Table VII we observe that the median performance of specialized PE buyouts mainly 
follows the same trends as with all buyouts. The DiD estimates are in general similar in sign 
and magnitude to all buyouts. However, the improvements in asset turnover relative to the 
controls are only significant (at 10%-level) in the first year. This can be partly due to fewer 
observations.  
 
43 The portfolio companies’ median (mean) ROA of 11% (15%) is likely above their (pre-tax) WACC. As long as it is 
plausible to assume a (pre-tax) WACC below 11% (15%) the median (mean) PE portfolio company does indeed grow at 
returns above their cost of capital which implies value creation. 
The effect of Specialized PE is estimated by testing the differences in the percentage changes of the metrics between the portfolio companies and the control group from one year prior to the buyout (T-1) to T+5, and from T-1 to the last full 
year prior to exit to capture the full holding period development. T-1 is the starting point of which the relative changes in the medians reflect (see equation (4)). Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test for significance of the median 
changes in relative performance over time (the DiD estimate). The tests are two-tailed. Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively.
 
Table VII – Performance by Specialized PE 
Panel A: Median Differences                                   
    Values at T - 1   Difference Relative to T - 1 
    
T - 1 
  
T + 1 
  
T + 2 
  
T + 3           
    Buyouts Controls   Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
    Level Level   % Change % Change   % Change % Change   % Change % Change 
                                      
  Sales - -   24% 9% 14% 0.00***   40% 10% 30% 0.00***   35% 12% 23% 0.00*** 
                                      
  EBITDA - -   22% 8% 14% 0.06*   35% 2% 33% 0.01***   47% -2% 48% 0.04** 
                                      
  ROS 0.123 0.085   -8% 0% -8% 0.84   -7% -2% -5% 0.21   -1% -17% 16% 0.63 
                                      
  Asset turnover 1.253 1.450   10% 3% 7% 0.07*   4% -3% 7% 0.18   0% -6% 6% 0.35 
                                      
  ROA 0.111 0.113   0% -2% 3% 0.41   2% -20% 22% 0.14   -9% -14% 4% 0.38 
                                      
  tan ROA 0.156 0.125   15% -2% 17% 0.02**   4% -21% 25% 0.01**   7% -11% 19% 0.04** 
                                      
  WC ratio 0.089 0.091   -24% -4% -20% 0.03**   -43% -16% -27% 0.13   -18% 10% -27% 0.08* 
                                      
  Adj. NWC ratio 0.001 -0.017   -8% -11% 3% 0.91   -12% -5% -7% 0.79   -24% 5% -29% 0.41 
                                      
  Number of Obs. 140 626                               
          Difference Relative to T - 1 
          
T + 4 
  
T + 5 
  
Exit                
          Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
  Buyouts Controls 
DiD P-value 
          % Change % Change   % Change % Change   % Change % Change 
                                      
  Sales - -   50% 23% 27% 0.01***   59% 35% 25% 0.09*   41% 13% 29% 0.00*** 
                                      
  EBITDA - -   49% 17% 32% 0.03**   62% 19% 43% 0.13   52% 1% 51% 0.01*** 
                                      
  ROS - -   -11% -9% -2% 0.73   4% -13% 17% 0.33   0% -14% 15% 0.79 
                                      
  Asset turnover - -   0% -1% 1% 0.47   5% -3% 8% 0.67   3% -1% 4% 0.35 
                                      
  ROA - -   -1% -13% 12% 0.37   -10% -21% 11% 0.35   -3% -15% 12% 0.50 
                                      
  tan ROA - -   13% -17% 30% 0.02**   18% -21% 39% 0.04**   8% -15% 23% 0.03** 
                                      
  WC ratio - -   -62% 8% -70% 0.01***   -39% 27% -66% 0.00***   -39% 3% -42% 0.03** 
                                      
  Adj. NWC ratio - -   -18% -15% -4% 0.71   -44% -4% -40% 0.04**   -23% -14% -9% 0.85 
We formalize our tests and conduct the following regression on the subsample of specialized 
PE transactions and their controls: 
(7) 
The results of the regression on specialized buyouts and their controls from entry to exit are 
provided in Table VIII. Surprisingly, the effect of specialized PE buyouts on CAGR sales 
appears to be lower than for all buyouts (6 percentage points versus 7 percentage points), and 
the effect on EBITDA is not significant. Similar to all buyouts, there is no effect on ROS, 
asset turnover or ROA, and the coefficients even turn slightly negative for ROS and asset 
turnover. While there is evidence of improvements in working capital, this improvement is 
also lower than for all buyouts (8 percentage points versus 11 percentage points). 
Apparently, specialized PE buyouts appear to perform worse than non-specialized PE 
buyouts (generalists). We also test whether these differences are statistically significant. In 
Table IX we run the following regression to identify whether there are differences in 
performance between specialized buyouts and generalist PE buyouts (relative to their control 
groups):  
(8) 
where Specialized is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for all specialized buyouts and their 
control companies, while PE is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for all buyouts. 
PE*Specialized captures the additional effect of specialization on PE-buyouts (relative to the 
control groups). To elaborate, PE captures the effect of non-specialized buyouts relative to 
the controls of non-specialized buyouts. PE*Specialized captures the effect of specialized 
buyouts relative to non-specialized buyouts. This will allow us to detect any potential 





Table VIII – Performance of Specialized PE vs Benchmark 
Panel A: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                         
                                  
Independent                                  
Variables   Dependent Variables 
    CAGR sales   Delta EBITDA %   Delta ROS   Delta asset turnover   Delta ROA   Delta tan ROA   Delta WC   Delta adj. NWC 
                                  
PE*Specialized   0.06***   0.19   -0.00   -0.02   0.01   0.05***   -0.08***   -0.01 
    (0.0126)   (0.2585)   (0.0122)   (0.0571)   (0.0128)   (0.0174)   (0.0245)   (0.0179) 
                                  
Holding period   -0.00   0.02   0.00**   0.02   -0.00**   -0.01***   0.00   0.00 
    (0.0023)   (0.0532)   (0.0021)   (0.0121)   (0.0020)   (0.0027)   (0.0052)   (0.0035) 
                                  
Initial sales   -4.28E-09                             
    (3.580E-9)                             
Initial EBITDA       -3.03E-7**                         
        (1.47E-7)                         
Initial ROS           -0.21***                     
            (0.0394)                     
Initial asset turnover             -0.25***                 
                (0.0325)                 
Initial ROA                   -0.44***             
                    (0.0575)             
Initial tan ROA                       -0.36***         
                        (0.0518)         
Initial WC/sales                           0.03     
                            (0.0315)     
Initial adj. NWC/sales                           -0.01 
                                (0.0229) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Sector Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Constant   0.03   0.39   0.02   0.42**   0.05**   0.07***   -0.00   0.01 
    (0.0127)   (0.4389)   (0.0240)   (0.1727)   (0.0219)   (0.0280)   (0.0492)   (0.0403) 
N   569   569   569   569   569   569   569   569 
R-squared   0.1066   0.062   0.1933   0.1838   0.3947   0.3316   0.0498   0.0508 
Robust SE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
This table depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts by specialized PE funds from entry (T-1) to Exit (exit year-1) compared to the matched control group. All observations, N (569), includes both 
companies backed by specialized PE investors and the control companies. The regressions are OLS regressions. In total the table shows eight separate regressions ran on eight different dependent variables. Besides 
controlling for the initial value of the relevant dependent variable, all regressions have the same controls. A description of all variables included in the model is given in Table A.VI in the Appendix. The 
significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, respectively.
This table depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts by specialized PE funds from entry (T-1) to Exit (exit year-1) compared to PE deals by generalists’ funds (non-specialized). We control for other non-specialized PE 
transactions’ performance as well as specialized deals control groups. As such, PE*Specialized shows the multiplicative effect of being a PE-backed company acquired by specialists. All observations, N (858), includes both companies 
backed by PE investors and the control companies. The regressions are OLS regressions. In total the table shows eight separate regressions ran on eight different dependent variables. Besides controlling for the initial value of the relevant 
dependent variable, all regressions have the same controls. A description of all variables included in the model is given in Table A.VI in the Appendix. The significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, 
respectively.
Table IX - PE Specialists vs PE Generalists 
Panel B: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                         
                                  
Independent                                  
Variables   Dependent Variables 
                                  
    CAGR sales   Delta EBITDA %   Delta ROS   Delta asset turnover   Delta ROA   Delta tan ROA   Delta WC   Delta adj. NWC 
                                  
PE dummy   0.10***   1.14**   0.03   0.11   0.02   0.05   -0.17***   0.00 
    (0.0168)   (0.5067)   (0.0198)   0.0959   0.0226   (0.0300)   (0.0483)   (0.0270) 
                                  
PE*Specialized   -0.04**   -0.94*   -0.03   -0.12   -0.01   -0.00   0.08   -0.01 
    (0.0210)   (0.5697)   (0.0230)   0.111   0.0259   (0.0345)   0.0541   (0.0325) 
                                  
Specialized    0.01   0.02   0.01   -0.06   -0.02   -0.02   -0.09**   -0.01 
    (0.0108)   (0.2343)   (0.0137)   0.06   0.01   (0.0131)   (0.0384)   (0.0174) 
                                  
Holding period   -0.00   0.02   0.00**   0.00   -0.00**   -0.01**   0.00   0.00 
    (0.0019)   (0.0420)   (0.0022)   (0.0104)   (0.0018)   (0.0024)   (0.0057)   (0.0031) 
                                  
Initial sales   -3.24E-09                             
    (3.020E-9)                             
Initial EBITDA       -3.54E-7**                         
        (1.58E-7)                         
Initial ROS           -0.20***                     
            (0.0359)                     
Initial asset turnover             -0.21***                 
                (0.0283)                 
Initial ROA                   -0.45***             
                    (0.0530)             
Initial tan ROA                       -0.28***         
                        (0.0688)         
Initial WC/sales                           0.03     
                            (0.0180)     
Initial adj. NWC/sales                             -0.01** 
                                (0.0035) 
                                  
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Sector Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Constant   0.03   0.37   0.00   0.46***   0.07**   0.09**   -0.04   -0.01 
    (0.0246)   (0.4609)   (0.0276)   (0.1734)   (0.0230)   (0.0300)   (0.0552)   (0.0408) 
N   858   858   858   858   858   858   858   858 
R-squared   0.1123   0.0629   0.1627   0.1295   0.3282   0.2227   0.0445   0.0536 
Robust SE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
From Table IX we observe that the effect of PE specialization is significant and negative on 
CAGR sales (-4 percentage points) and EBITDA (-94%) relative to generalists. Although the 
effect is not significant for ROS, asset turnover and ROA, the coefficients are negative. In 
sum, we find no evidence of a positive specialization effect on PE in Norway. We therefore 
find no support for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between PE fund’s 
degree of specialization by industry and performance post-buyout. In fact, our results point 
in the opposite direction with a negative effect on turnover growth and EBITDA, and even 
though the effect on ROS, asset turnover and ROA are not statistically significant, they are 
all negative in sign.  
Our results are in line with research by Ljungqvist & Richards (2003), Lossen (2007), Brigl 
et al. (2008) and Aigner et al. (2008) who could not find any positive relationship between 
portfolio company returns and the level of specialization. On the other hand, our findings 
contrast Cressy’s (2007) findings in the UK of a specialization premium of 8.5% on 
operating profitability and a positive (although not always statistically significant) effect on 
turnover growth.  
One possible explanation for the poor performance of specialized buyouts relative to 
generalists, is the Norwegian market’s relative specialization in Oil & Gas. The Oil & Gas 
industry has performed poorly since the oil prices plunged in 2014. We have aimed to 
control for this by controlling for sector and year fixed effects, but the SNF database’s sector 
classification might not be sufficiently granular to properly deal with this issue as Oil & Gas 
is not classified as a separate sector. Another explanation for the poor performance of 
specialized buyouts relative to generalists could be that foreign GP’s that invest in Norway 
are not able to capitalize on their inhouse expertise cross-border. In other words, the three 
potential advantages of specialization outlined in section 2.3 do not seem to result in any 
superior operating performance to general or more diversified funds, and actually suggest the 
opposite. However, these advantages are predominantly related to entry, leverage 
capabilities and exit factors and is therefore something that might be more prevalent on fund-
level. In contrast, our findings are more in line with the counterarguments suggesting that PE 
is able to leverage outside expertise regardless or selecting companies with already strong 
management teams in place. These factors might offset the hypothesized advantages of 
specialization, at least on company-level. 
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5.3 Deal Types 
Finally, we assess whether there exist any systematic differences in performance among 
different deal types. We run the following regression where each deal type (except PIPE) is 
tested against its respective benchmark:  
  (9) 
where PIPE is the omitted variable. The interaction terms between PE and the deal type 
captures the performance of the respective deal type relative to its control companies.  
Table X below provides evidence that all the deal types outperform their benchmarks with 
respect to sales growth. The exception is public buyouts for which the effect is not 
significant (possibly because of fewer observations). Furthermore, the effect of PE on sales 
growth appears to be strongest for private buyouts, with an outperformance of 8 percentage 
points. A possible explanation for secondary and private-to-private buyouts significantly 
outpacing their controls in terms of CAGR sales is that they have more underleveraged 
potential from financing and ramping up organic and structural growth post-buyout, 
compared to public-to-private companies which have had better access to capital pre-buyout. 
This is consistent with previous research finding that the former category is more likely to 
make add-on acquisitions than public-to-private buyouts (Hammer et al., 2017). Hammer et 
al. (2017) suggests that this is likely because public PE-targets already have realized 
inorganic growth opportunities as a public company. Our findings are also in line with 
Boucly et al.’s (2011) findings in France. They suggest that this might be the result of new 
sources of value creation strategies in PE, with PE targeting under-developed, credit-
constrained firms to support them in growing faster. Since targets of private-to-private deals 
are more likely to be credit constrained pre-buyout than public companies (or former 
divisions of larger companies), PE supports these companies with capital to take advantage 
of unexploited growth opportunities (Boucly et al., 2011).  
 
Table X – Performance by Deal Type 
Panel A: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                             
                                  
Independent                                  
Variables   Dependent Variables 
                                  
    CAGR sales   Delta EBITDA %   Delta ROS   Delta asset turnover   Delta ROA   Delta tan ROA   Delta WC   Delta adj. NWC 
                                  
Private-to-Private   0.02   0.13   -0.02   0.04   -0.01   -0.01   0.06   -0.01 
    (0.0258)   (0.6683)   (0.0250)   (0.1174)   (0.2570)   (0.0290)   (0.0614)   (0.0362) 
                                  
Secondary   0.03   0.13   -0.03   0.06   -0.01   -0.02   0.01   -0.02 
    (0.0269)   (0.6922)   (0.0257)   (0.1217)   (0.0266)   (0.0296)   (0.0644)   (0.0373) 
                                  
Public-to-Private   0.03   -0.05   -0.01   0.11   0.01   0.01   0.07   0.01 
    (0.0317)   (0.6938)   (0.0324)   (0.1426)   (0.0298)   (0.0364)   (0.0918)   (0.0449) 
                                  
Div. Buyout   0.03   0.26   -0.02   -0.07   -0.02   -0.03   0.09   -0.02 
    (0.0283)   (0.6861)   (0.0272)   (0.1223)   (0.0298)   (0.0306)   (0.0705)   (0.0398) 
                                  
PE*Private-to-Private   0.08***   0.47   -0.01   0.07   -0.00   0.02   -0.14***   -0.01 
    (0.0139)   (0.3475)   (0.0139)   (0.7549)   (0.0163)   (0.0222)   (0.0291)   (0.0194) 
                                  
PE*Secondary   0.06***   -0.06   0.02   -0.12   0.04   0.07*   0.04   0.05 
    (0.0178)   (0.3555)   (0.0244)   (0.0989)   (0.0269)   (0.0356)   (0.0607)   (0.0353) 
                                  
PE*Public-to-Private   0.06   1.51**   0.06*   0.09   0.05**   0.14***   -0.07   0.01 
    (0.0414)   (0.7185)   (0.0371)   (0.1827)   (0.0202)   (0.0477)   (0.0849)   (0.0537) 
                                  
PE*Div. Buyout    0.06**   0.47   0.04   0.05   0.04   0.08**   -0.22***   -0.04 
    (0.0272)   (0.6394)   (0.0297)   (0.0847)   (0.0262)   (0.0352)   (0.0595)   (0.0411) 
                                  
Holding period   -0.00   0.03   0.00   0.00   0.00**   -0.01**   0.00   0.00 
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Initial sales   -2.05E-09                             
    (3.190E-9)                             
Initial EBITDA       0.00**                         
        (1.700E-07)                         
Initial ROS           -0.20***                     
            (0.0367)                     
Initial asset turnover               -0.22***                 
                (0.0289)                 
Initial ROA                   -0.45***             
                    (0.0537)             
Initial tan ROA                       -0.28***         
                        (0.0690)         
Initial WC/sales                           0.03     
                            (0.0178)     
Initial adj. NWC/sales                               -0.01*** 
                                (0.0035) 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Sector Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
                                  
Constant   0.00   0.19   0.03   0.38*   0.07**   0.08**   -0.08   0.00 
    (0.0362)   (0.8005)   (0.0345)   (0.2018)   (0.0320)   (0.0386)   (0.0760)   (0.0512) 
N   858   858   858   858   858   858   858   858 
R-squared   0.1157   0.0595   0.1685   0.1309   0.3298   0.2315   0.0447   0.0584 
Robust SE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Table X depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts segmented into deal types from entry (T-1) to Exit (exit year-1) compared to their control group. As such, PE*Deal type is the performance of PE-backed companies 
belonging to the specific deal type relative to its controls. All observations, N (858), includes both companies backed by PE investors and the control companies. All eight regressions are OLS regressions. A description of all 
variables included in the model is given in Table A.VI in the Appendix. The significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, respectively.
On EBITDA, Table X illustrates that public-to-private buyouts have the only significant 
impact with a 151% improvement (relative to their benchmark). Public buyouts are also the 
only deal type with a significant and positive effect on ROS (6 percentage points) and ROA 
(5 percentage points). This is in line with that public buyouts in particular are motivated by 
margin and asset productivity improvements which are often not captured in public 
companies (Muscarella & Vetsuypens 1990; Harris et al., 2005). The effects of secondaries 
and divisional buyouts on ROA are positive in sign, although barely not statistically 
significant. Finally, divisional buyouts and private buyouts have significant working capital 
improvements of 22 and 14 percentage points, respectively.  
To formally test whether there are differences in performance between the different PE deal 
types (relative to their control groups), we run the following regression:  
   (10) 
where the performance of each deal type relative to its respective benchmark is tested against 
the performance of private-to-private buyouts relative to its benchmark (the omitted 
variable). Hence, this regression is testing for differences between the coefficients of the 
different deal types and private buyouts from the previous regression. PE*deal type captures 
the additional effect of the respective deal type relative to private-to-private buyouts which is 
the omitted variable (again, relative to each deal type’s matched control group). 
The regression results in Table XI provide evidence that private-to-private buyouts 
outperform PIPEs with respect to CAGR sales by 10 percentage points. However, the 
differences between all other deal types and private-to-private are not statistically different 
from zero. Hence, the regression analysis does not lend support to infer that private-to-
private buyouts have a higher sales growth than public buyouts, secondaries or divisional 
buyouts (relative to their benchmarks).  
 
Table XI - Deal Types Relative Performance 
Panel B: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                           
                                  
Independent                                  
Variables   Dependent Variables 
                                  
    CAGR sales   Delta EBITDA %   Delta ROS   Delta asset turnover   Delta ROA   Delta tan ROA   Delta WC   Delta adj. NWC 
                                  
PE dummy   0.08***   0.47   -0.01   0.07   -0.00   0.02   -0.14***   -0.13 
    (0.0139)   (0.3477)   (0.0138)   (0.0755)   (0.0163)   (0.0222)   (0.0292)   (0.0194) 
                                  
Secondary   0.01   0.00   -0.01   0.03   0.00   -0.01   -0.05   -0.01 
    (0.0136)   (0.3363)   (0.0155)   (0.0716)   (0.0134)   (0.0165)   (0.0457)   (0.0214) 
                                  
Public-to-Private   0.01   -0.19   0.02   0.07   0.02   0.02   0.01   0.03 
    (0.0218)   (0.4170)   (0.0255)   (0.1038)   (0.0190)   (0.0255)   (0.0811)   (0.0337) 
                                  
Div. Buyout   0.01   0.13   0.00   -0.10   -0.01   -0.14   0.02   -0.00 
    0.02   0.36   (0.0191)   (0.0684)   0.02   0.02   (0.0484)   0.02 
                                  
PIPE   -0.02   -0.61   0.01   -0.10   0.01   0.00   -0.07   0.01 
    (0.0299)   (0.5576)   (0.0279)   (0.1392)   (0.0305)   (0.0340)   (0.0715)   (0.0403) 
                                  
PE*Secondary   -0.02   -0.53   0.03   -0.19   0.04   0.05   0.18***   0.06 
    (0.0226)   (0.4980)   (0.0279)   (0.1243)   (0.0314)   (0.0413)   (0.0673)   (0.0403) 
                                  
PE*Public-to-Private -0.02   1.04   0.07*   0.02   0.05*   0.13**   0.07   0.03 
    (0.0437)   (0.7974)   (0.0390)   (0.1973)   (0.0271)   (0.0532)   (0.0896)   (0.0569) 
                                  
PE*Div. Buyout    -0.02   0.00   0.05   -0.02   0.04   0.06   -0.08   -0.03 
    (0.0305)   0.73   (0.0329)   (0.1137)   0.03   (0.0415)   (0.0660)   0.05 
                                  
PE*PIPE   -0.10**   1.81   0.08*   -0.16   0.01   0.02   0.15*   0.01 
    (0.0487)   (1.8200)   (0.0448)   (0.1595)   0.04   (0.0445)   (0.0809)   0.07 
                                  
Holding period   -0.00   0.03   0.00   0.00   0.00**   -0.01**   0.00   0.00 
    (0.0020)   (0.0429)   (0.0022)   (0.0105)   (0.0019)   (0.0024)   (0.0056)   (0.0031) 
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Initial sales   -2.06E-09                             
    (3.150E-9)                             
Initial EBITDA       3.55E-7**                         
        (1.790E-7)                         
Initial ROS           -0.20***                     
            (0.0366)                     
Initial asset turnover             -0.22***                 
                (0.0289)                 
Initial ROA                   -0.45***             
                    (0.0537)             
Initial tan ROA                       -0.28***         
                        (0.0691)         
Initial WC/sales                           0.03     
                            (0.0178)     
Initial adj. NWC/sales                             -0.01*** 
                                (0.0035) 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Constant   0.03   0.33   0.01   0.42**   0.06***   0.07***   -0.02   -0.01 
    (0.0237)   (0.4457)   (0.0264)   (0.1730)   (0.0211)   (0.0260)   (0.0526)   (0.0389) 
N   858   858   858   858   858   858   858   858 
R-squared   0.1159   0.0635   0.1701   0.1311   0.3298   0.2318   0.0447   0.0584 
Robust SE   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Table XI depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts segmented into deal types from entry (T-1) to Exit (exit year-1) relative to private-to-private. We have omitted private-to-private 
deals and its controls, which the relative performance of the other deal types is measured against. All observations, N (858), includes both companies backed by PE investors and the control 
companies. All eight regressions are OLS regressions. A description of all variables included in the model is given in Table A.VI in the Appendix. The significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are 
denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, respectively. 
On the other hand, PIPEs have a positive effect of 8 percentage points on ROS relative to 
private-to-private buyouts. When it comes to working capital management, private-to-
private buyouts perform significantly better than secondaries and PIPEs. Relative to 
secondaries, this is not particularly surprising, given that “quick fixes'' have already been 
captured by the previous PE owner. More importantly, the results in Table XI confirm that 
public buyouts outperform private-to-private buyouts with respect to ROS and ROA with 7 
and 5 percentage points, respectively. Notably, most of the previous research on PE 
operating profitability has been conducted on public buyouts. Because our sample is skewed 
towards private buyouts, this could partly explain why we did not, on an overall basis, find 
evidence of operating profitability improvements (except when restricting the sample to 
public buyouts), in contrast to previous research such as Kaplan (1989) which focused on 
public buyouts44. 
It is, however, interesting to observe that the evidence on the operating performance of 
public buyouts is also divided. While there is clear evidence for operating improvements in 
the first buyout wave (see e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; Singh (1990), the evidence is 
less clear after the first buyout wave, where most studies (see e.g. Guo et al., 2011; Cohn et 
al., 2014; Weir et al., 2015) find modest to no improvements. The latter findings may be due 
to more well managed investment targets over time.   
The lack of operating profitability improvements in our sample might be due to private-to-
private buyouts (which is the predominant deal type in our sample) already having 
concentrated ownership, and hence PE’s investment rationale and value creation levers for 
these companies might not be the same as hypothesized by Jensen (1989) (Morris & 
Phalippou, 2019). More specifically, the advantages of concentrating ownership and using 
leverage to align management incentives in order to free up cash might not be as relevant in 
the typical (private-to-private) post 2000 PE deals in Norway. Instead, the rationale and 
levers for these deals might be to support these companies with capital, management skills 
and experience to take advantage of unexploited growth opportunities as suggested by 
Boucly et al. (2011). The latter approach favors growth and not necessarily margins, which 
is also in line with our findings. 
 
44 Note that there are of course many other factors in play here, such as the time period and geography. 
    
5.4 Limitations  
It is important to point out that although we have applied the PSM methodology to mimic a 
random experiment and furthermore based our analysis on difference in difference 
estimates, one should be careful with interpreting the results causally. Distinguishing PE’s 
investment selection skills from their active ownership skills (and impact on performance) 
have limitations almost regardless of methodologies, although we have diligently designed 
and implemented the empirical research to reflect best practice. The accounting metrics used 
for constructing the control group through PSM are likely not able to encompass all factors 
impacting the buyout decision and the subsequent performance due to the potential 
existence of unobservable effects. For example, GP’s might be superior in identifying 
companies with strong management or favorable growth prospects and matching on pre-
buyout growth could have further strengthened the distinction as PE appears to target 
companies in growth (NVCA, 2020; Gulliksen et al., 2008). By matching on pre-event 
performance through the chosen covariates, we have likely captured some of the effect, but 
we cannot confidently rule out that there might be an endogeneity problem. As emphasized 
by Boucly et al. (2011), the lack of a proper source of exogenous variation in the probability 
to be involved in a deal leads to a bias in the results. The results we provide should thus be 
interpreted as descriptive for the Norwegian PE market, while more caution should be 
applied in the causal interpretations. 
We have assumed that operating changes (sooner or later during the holding period) 
manifest themselves in the accounting figures used for measuring operating performance. 
Applying the exit year to measure PE operating performance might not be optimal, since the 
timing of the exit may be correlated with performance and stock market valuations. 
However, the nature of the buyout process involves implementation of measures which 
often do not materialize before the very end of the holding period. In this regard, the exit 
should be expected when the implemented measures in fact materialize suggesting that the 
exit year best depicts the true value creation of a buyout.  
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6. Conclusion 
By comparing the post-buyout operating performance of a comprehensive sample of 214 
buyouts in Norway to the performance of a propensity matched control group, our main 
objective is to answer the following question: Does Private Equity have a (relative) positive 
impact on operating performance? Our research documents that PE ownership appears to 
improve sales and EBITDA growth. Our findings also indicate that PE portfolio companies 
experience working capital improvements under PE ownership. However, we find no 
evidence of improvements in operating profitability (ROA) across the entire sample of 
buyouts. Examining the subcomponents of ROA yields some evidence of improvements in 
asset turnover which are offset by stable margins.  
Furthermore, we find no support for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between PE fund’s degree of specialization by industry and performance post-buyout. If 
anything, this effect appears to be negative. Finally, our research indicates that there are 
differences in performance among deal types in Norway. For the subsample of public 
buyouts, we find improvements in operating profitability and margins, also relative to 
private-to-private buyouts. In contrast, private-to-private buyouts appear to be more growth-
oriented, clearly outperforming their benchmark in sales growth. We also find that private-
to-private buyouts improve the working capital ratio more than other deal types.  
On an overall basis, our findings suggest that value created in Norwegian PE deals is 
generally attributable to sales and EBITDA growth which is in line with most previous 
research on the Nordic PE market. Thus, PE appears to actively focus on boosting the sales 
of their companies organically and structurally, particularly through acquiring market 
shares. This is consistent with previous research documenting the positive relationships 
between growth and investment returns (Cambridge Associates, 2019), as growth can 
directly generate multiple expansion and these growth investments have also benefited from 
the general multiple increases over the last decades. It is also consistent with the previously 
outlined structural shift taking place in PE markets with the development of new value 
creating strategies in parallel to the maturing of the traditional LBO market.  
Growth versus LBO type strategies is also reflected in the performance dynamics we 
observe within different deal types. Private-to-private and secondaries experience significant 
improvements in sales growth, in contrast to public buyouts experiencing improvements in 
    
margins and operating profitability. The two former types are likely more growth-oriented 
strategies and the latter are likely more oriented towards the traditional LBO strategies. The 
solid outperformance in sales and EBITDA in general can indicate that PE ownership 
enables advantageous long-term planning and execution compared to companies under 
different ownership forms. Hence, being able to support their portfolio companies with 
capital over years, combined with concentrated execution power enabling swift decision 
making, can create a more efficient vehicle for growth and expansion.  
By examining the operating performance of 214 portfolio companies, our findings yield 
additional understanding and insight on the value creation impact and value creation areas of 
private equity in Norway. While we have focused on assessing the operating performance of 
PE portfolio companies, specialized versus generalist PE fund managers and the differences 
in performance among different deal types, we have not formally attempted to examine the 
relationship between performance and specific initiatives (such as cost cutting, productivity 
improvements, organic revenue improvement, internationalization, M&A, working capital 
reduction and capital expenditure reduction initiatives) PE implement to create value. It 
would also be interesting to examine the relationship between operating performance 
improvements and gross and net (after the costs of the PE model) investment returns. This 
would have enabled an understanding of the relative investment return impact of various 
performance improvement typologies (such as organic growth, structural growth, margin 
improvement and working capital efficiency) and underlying initiatives to deliver such 
performance improvements. Future research should test these relationships so that we can 
try to understand the impact of different PE initiatives on performance typologies and 
overall investment returns. Such highly relevant and interesting relationships will become 
more accessible to research as the sample and codification of Norwegian buyouts expands in 
line with the continuously maturing Norwegian PE market. Moreover, this will enable 
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Appendix 
Figure A.I – Total Sample Sector Distribution 
  
Figure A.1 illustrates the total sample of buyouts conducted between 2000 - 2015 distributed by sector. The 
four largest sectors range from 34 (IT) to Industrials (53) in number of buyouts. Others: Communication, 
Health Care, Materials, Utilities, Financials.   
Figure A.II – Buyout Distribution by Deal Type and Investment Year (data sample) 
 
Figure A.II depicts the buyout distribution by deal type and the year the investment was made. We can notice a 
strong growth in number of investments made since 2000. Additionally, we notice substantial variation in 
numbers of investments as well, indicating that economic cycles and other time dependent factors are 
impacting the timing of the investments.   
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Figure A.III – Sample Buyout Distribution by Exits (2000-2015) 
 
Figure A.III provides an overview of the buyout sample distributed by exit channels. For further research, it 
could be interesting to study the relationship between choice of exit channel and performance.  
Figure A.IV – Matching Algorithms  
 
(Source: Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). We have chosen the alternative of Nearest Neighbor (NN) and allow for 




    
 
Figure A.V – Distribution of Propensity Scores 
In this figure we conduct a rough assessment of the common area of support. Since we do not condition on all 
covariates but on the propensity score, i.e., the predicted probability of treatment derived from the fitted 
logistic regression model, it has to be checked if the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of 
the relevant variables in both groups. Below we see that the propensity score between treated and untreated 
subjects overlaps, indicating that there is a nonzero probability of being in the untreated and treated group for 













Table A.I – Estimation of Propensity Score 
Table A.I shows the output from the propensity score estimation using logistic regression. These are the 
variables we have decided to include for matching. We see that year, sector, log_sales and sales/assets all are 
significant variables at 95% level of confidence or higher for receiving treatment. However, while the 
ebitda/sales variable is not statistically significant, variables known to be associated with selection should also 
be included (even non-significant) (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). After testing several other combinations of 
variables, this combination was found to provide the best trade-off between sample size and economic 
significance based on previous literature and GP surveys. We have provided an explanation of why we have 
decided to not include any other variables for matching when determining the distance measure in section 
4.4.1.  
           
           
Coefficients:           
  Estimate Std. Error  z value Pr(>|z|)   
(Intercept)   7.55E+01 2.35E+01 3.218 0.00129 ** 
year -4.62E-02 1.17E-02 -3.951 7.78E-05 *** 
sector 5.66E-02 2.74E-02 2.068 0.03862 * 
ebitda/sales -3.68E-05 9.21E-04 -0.04 0.96814   
log_sales 7.89E-01 2.34E-02 33.667 < 2e-16 *** 
sales/assets -2.29E-01 5.14E-02 -4.461 8.16E-06 *** 
---           
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’  0.001  ‘**’  0.01  ‘*’  0.05  ‘.’  0.1  ‘ ’  1   
 
Table A.II – SNF Sector List 
This is a subdivision into 10 common industry groups based on matching the two sets of industry codes in the 
SNF database. We note that there are a significant number of firms in each sector, thus we argue that the 
common support is likely satisfied.  
Common industry group Number of    
sector code   firm*year Distribution 
Agriculture    70,577 2.0% 
Offshore/Shipping 70,466 2.0% 
Transport    109,041 3.0% 
Manufacturing 211,949 5.9% 
Telecom/IT/Technology 115,863 3.2% 
Electricity   16,217 0.5% 
Building & Construction 1,134,645 31.7% 
Trade   747,528 20.9% 
Finance   203,188 5.7% 
Other   897,236 25.1% 
Total   3,576,710 100.0% 
(SNF, 2016) 
    
 
Table A.III – Potential Controls sample vs Buyout sample 
This table shows the number of controls relative to PE-backed companies. 1053 control companies are 
matched to the buyouts. Thus, it does not appear to be an issue with allowing for replacement in the nearest 
neighbor matching procedure as it is 4.92 controls per treated company. Additionally, prior to matching, the 
data sets have been filtered to exclude observations with missing information (e.g. Sector) or misspecified 
values (e.g. negative Revenues or Total Assets) for the variables which are included in the empirical tests. This 
results in a loss of 5 buyout companies. Hence, observations missing any necessary matching parameters were 
already removed which is why discarded shows zero.   
  Control Buyout 
All 3192017  214 
Matched 1053  214 
Unmatched 3190964  0 
Discarded 0  0 
 
Table A.IV – Bias reduction in Covariates (1:1)  
Table A.IV shows an assessment of the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement. One-to-one 
matching provides a substantially percent balance improvement on all covariates. However, compared to five-
to-one matching the standardized mean differences in the EBITDA margin and asset turnover compared are 
higher. Meanwhile the variance ratios are within the range of acceptance. However, the variance ratios of asset 
turnover and log of sales shows an increase in the variance. Additionally, the P-values are substantially lower 
in one-to-one matching compared to five-to-one. Overall, the closest neighbor to the treated individuals 
appears to be similar on the covariates, but the five-to-one matching provides the benefit of better balancing 
the mean differences. Thus, the five-to-one matching is preferred. 
1 : 1 Nearest Neighbor 

















                
Year 
Unmatched 2008.3925 2009.3131 -0.2452   0.3865 0 
Matched 2008.3925 2008.3925 0 100.00% 0.9999 1 
                
Industry 
Unmatched 6.6121 7.5135 -0.3207   1.6422 0 
Matched 6.6121 6.6121 0 100.00% 0.9999 1 
                
Log Sales 
Unmatched 12.749 7.7104 4.1815   0.3118 0 
Matched 12.749 12.7852 -0.03 99.30% 0.9503 0.7593 
                
EBITDA/Sales 
Unmatched 0.1283 -0.7718 5.827   0 0 
Matched 0.1283 0.1094 0.1225 97.90% 0.7026 0.2502 
                
Sales/Assets 
Unmatched 1.5618 2.3611 -0.9797   0.0007 0 
Matched 1.5618 1.6896 -0.1567 84.01% 0.5156 0.1821 
                
Number of 
observations 
Unmatched 214 3192017         
Matched 214 212         
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Table A.V – Bias Reduction in Covariates (w. caliper 0.1) 
This table show the bias reduction in the covariates means after five-to-one nearest neighbor matching with a 
caliper of 0.1. Given that the sample size is branched into year and industry, this might result in few 
observations remaining in some categories. However, based on the large number of observations within each 
sector shown in Table A.II, we deem this unlikely. Additionally, a caliper is commonly implemented in fear of 
being outside the common area of support. As shown in Figure A.V we see that most of the individuals are in 
(or close to) the area of common support. By comparing this table to Table IV we note that the standardized 
mean differences somewhat increase for log of sales, EBITDA margin and asset turnover. Thus, we argue that 
the caliper does not provide any significant changes besides reducing the treatment sample by 9.    
5 : 1 Nearest Neighbor Matching (w. caliper 0.1)            












                
Year 
Unmatched 2008.3925 2009.3131 -0.2452   0.3865 0 
Matched 2008.3463 2008.3463 0 100.00% 1.0038 1 
                
Industry 
Unmatched 6.6121 7.5135 -0.3207   1.6422 0 
Matched 6.6341 6.6341 0 100.00% 1.0038 1 
                
Log Sales 
Unmatched 12.749 7.7104 4.1815   0.3118 0 
Matched 12.6321 12.6408 -0.0072 99.80% 0.9299 0.3793 
                
EBITDA/Sales 
Unmatched 0.1283 -0.7718 5.827   0 0 
Matched 0.1272 0.1109 0.1053 98.20% 0.4444 0.2602 
                
Sales/Assets 
Unmatched 1.5618 2.3611 -0.9797   0.001 0 
Matched 1.5824 1.6108 -0.0349 96.40% 0.595 0.57151 
                
Number of 
observations 
Unmatched 205 3192017         
Matched 205 970         











    
Table A.VI – Description of All Variables Included in the Regression Models  
Dependent Variables    
    
CAGR sales The mean Continuous Annual Growth Rate for Sales 
    
Delta EBITDA % The mean %-change in Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortizations 
    
Delta ROS Mean change in Return on Sales (EBITDA/Sales) 
    
Delta asset turnover Mean change in asset turnover (Sales/Total Assets) 
    
Delta ROA Mean change in Return on Assets (EBITDA/Total Assets) 
    
Delta tan ROA Mean change in Return on Tangible Assets (EBITDA/Tangible Assets) 
    
Delta WC Mean change in Working Capital relative to Sales (WC/Sales) 
    
Delta adj. NWC Mean change in adjusted Net Working Capital relative to Sales (Adj. NWC/Sales) 
    
    
Theoretical Independent Variables   
    
PE dummy 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is a portfolio company (PE-
owned) and 0 for control companies  
    
PE*Specialized 
An interaction term between the PE dummy and Specialized dummy both taking the 
value 1 at the same time, 0 if otherwise 
    
PE*Deal Type 
An interaction term between the PE dummy and Deal Type dummy both taking the 
value 1 at the same time, 0 if otherwise 
    
    
Control Variables   
    
Holding period 
The number of years from (and including) the first full (fiscal) year of ownership till 
(and including) the last full (fiscal) year prior to exit 
    
Initial values  
The level of the dependent variable of interest at the time of the PE transaction for the 
portfolio companies and the matched control companies 
    
Deal Types 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the specific deal type it belongs to. Matched 
controls also take the value 1 for the same  
  deal type as the portfolio company 
    
Specialized 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the portfolio company is acquired by a PE 
fund that is specialized according to the ICA index, 
  
0 if otherwise. The matched controls take the same value as the corresponding portfolio 
company.  
    
Year Fixed Effects 
A dummy that takes the value of 1 for the given years the company is owned by PE. 
Same for the matched controls. 
    
Sector Fixed Effects  
A dummy that takes the value 1 if a company is classified into one of the 10 industries 
based on the SNF database 






Table A.VII – Regression Analysis for All Buyouts without Fixed Effects (FE) 
Panel B: Post-Buyout Performance - Entry to Exit                 
                      
Independent                      
Variables Dependent Variables 







ROS   
Delta asset 




ROA Delta WC 
Delta adj. 
NWC 
                      
PE dummy 0.071*** 0.53** 0.01   0.04   0.015 0.04*** -0.11*** -0.01 
  (0.0101) (0.2504) (0.0107)   0.0498   (0.0114) 0.0161518 0.0227857 0.0150242 
                      
Holding period 0.00* -0.01 0.00*   0.01   0.00* -0.01** 0.00 0.00 
  (0.0020) (0.0382) (0.0017)   (0.0095)   (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0037) 
                      
Initial sales 0.00**                   
  (3.04E-9)                   
Initial EBITDA   0.00***                 
    (172.00E-9)                 
Initial ROS     -0.20***               
      (0.0362)               
Initial asset turnover       -0.17***           
          (0.0288)           
Initial ROA             -0.45***       
              (0.0052)       
Initial tan ROA               -0.27***     
                (0.0783)     
Initial WC/sales                 0.03   
                  (0.0193)   
Initial adj. NWC/sales                 -0.01*** 
                    (0.0037) 
Year FE No No No   No   No No No No 
Sector FE No No No   No   No No No No 
Constant 0.05*** 0.86*** 0.03**   0.19***   0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04 0.02 
  (0.0121) (0.2283) (0.0123)   (0.0581)   (0.0125) (0.0149) (0.0268) (0.0159) 
N 858 858 858   858   858 858 858 858 
R-squared 0.0589 0.0116 0.1195   0.0708   0.2849 0.1671 0.0225 0.0122 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes   Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table A.VII depicts the post-buyout performance for all buyouts from entry (T-1) to exit (exit year-1) 
compared to the matched control group. This means that N (858) includes both PE-backed companies and the 
control companies. The regressions are OLS regressions. In total the table shows eight separate regressions ran 
on eight different dependent variables. Besides controlling for the initial value of the relevant dependent 
variable, all regressions have the same controls. A description of all variables included in the model is given in 
Table A.VI in the Appendix. The significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by asterisk *, ** and ***, 
respectively. The results do not differ compared to Table VI, confirming that our matching approach has 
successfully accounted for year and sector effects. 
 
 
